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INTRODUCTION
Newspapers are in trouble. Circulation and advertising are
down as readers shift from print to online media.1 Their future
looks even worse.2 Although changing reader preferences and the


Marget Larson Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of Nebraska.
Newspaper circulation has dropped 30% over the past two decades and advertising
revenues are now less than half of their 2006 total. Rick Edmonds et al., Newspapers: By
the Numbers, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2012, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/
newspapers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-by-thenumbers. Forty percent of Americans now get most of their news from the Internet,
while only 20% said the same for newspapers. Kenny Olmstead et al., Digital: News
Gains Audience but Loses Ground in Chase for Revenue, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA
2012,
http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/digital-news-gains-audience-but-loses-moreground-in-chase-for-revenue.
2
Among 18–34 year-olds, less than 25% said they had read a newspaper the previous
day. Edmonds et al., supra note 1. Only financial newspapers such as the Wall Street
Journal have so far succeeded in enticing online readers to pay in significant numbers,
1
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loss of lucrative classified advertising to online sources are major
worries, the news media seems preoccupied with news aggregators
and bloggers who distribute news content on the Internet without
permission.3 Newspapers are not the only parties worried about
the unauthorized distribution of “their” news on the Internet.
Financial services companies are unhappy about the distribution of
their “hot” stock recommendations and analysis,4 while other
content providers seek to control online news ranging from movie
schedules5 to business ratings.6
Traditional copyright doctrine offers varying degrees of
protection for the literary format of the news—broad in scope for
the text of news stories, narrower and more uncertain for smaller
expressions like news headlines and leads (sometimes spelled
“ledes”).7 Content providers want more.8 They increasingly seek
to control the online distribution of not only their literary forms,
but also the very facts that constitute the news itself.9 Major media
but early results for The New York Times as it moves to limit free online access look
promising. Id. It is still unclear whether that strategy will succeed for more modest
publications.
3
Executives working for Rupert Murdoch, chairman of News Corp., have called news
aggregator Google a “tech tapeworm” and a “parasite.” Ian Burrell, Google Caves in to
Murdoch after Attack on “Parasites,” INDEPENDENT (UK), Dec. 3, 2009, at 18. Murdoch
himself is quoted as saying, “[t]o aggregate stories is not fair use. To be impolite, it is
theft.” Id. The chairman of Associated Press has said, “[w]e can no longer stand by and
watch others walk off with our work under misguided legal theories.” Staci D. Kramer,
AP Launching News Industry Campaign to “Protect” News Content, WASHINGTON POST
(Apr. 6, 2009, 4:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/04/06/AR2009040601970.html.
4
See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc. (Barclays II), 650 F.3d
876 (2d Cir. 2011); Agora Fin., LLC, v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2010).
5
See, e.g., Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp.
2d 1044 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
6
See, e.g., Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2009).
7
See generally Andrew Mirsky, Fair Use and Online Publishing: Legal and Practical
Guidance for Publishers, 78 PA. B.A. Q. 171, 172–74 (2007) (describing copyright and
fair use in the context of “reporting and uses of headlines, stories and other publisher
content by . . . web portals”).
8
See, e.g., Bruce W. Sanford, Bruce D. Brown & Laurie A. Babinski, Saving
Journalism with Copyright Reform and the Doctrine of Hot News, 26 COMM. LAW. 8, 8–9
(2009).
9
Brief for Amicus Curiae the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n (Sifma) in Support
of Affirmance at 1–3, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372-cv), 2010
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companies and giant online news distributors are now engaged in a
struggle over the rules that will govern access to factual
information on the Internet.10 The battle to control facts is being
waged on two fronts. One involves an attempt to extend the
traditional scope of copyright beyond the protection of expression
into the previously forbidden realm of facts, as plaintiffs claim
copyright in everything from car and coin prices to financial data.11
The second front involves efforts by content providers to enlist the
century-old common law tort of misappropriation, previously
repudiated by the likes of Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Learned Hand, Richard Posner, and the American Law Institute.12
WL 3032824; First Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and
Copyright Infringement, Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 Civ. 00546
(D.D.C. filed Apr. 26, 2005), 2005 WL 5834897.
10
Agence France-Presse, Associated Press, Gannett Co., N.Y. Times Co., Washington
Post, the publisher Reed Elsevier, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association, Google, Twitter, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation all were among the
businesses and interest groups who filed amici curiae briefs in Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876
(2d Cir. 2011), the latest battle over the use of facts on the Internet. See, e.g., Brief for
Amicus Curiae Sifma, supra note 9.
11
See., e.g., Barclays II, 650 F. 3d 876 (2d. Cir. 2011) (financial data); N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (car
prices); CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) (coin prices).
12
Justices Holmes and Brandeis both filed dissents in the case that gave birth to the
misappropriation doctrine. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press (INS), 248 U.S. 215,
246–67 (1918). Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, attempted to confine the
doctrine to news-gathering organizations operating during the First World War.
Responding to a plaintiff’s reliance on the misappropriation doctrine as articulated in
INS, Judge Hand wrote in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930):
Although that concerned another subject-matter—printed news
dispatches—we agree that, if it meant to lay down a general doctrine,
it would cover this case; at least, the language of the majority opinion
goes so far. We do not believe that it did. While it is of course true
that law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases where the
occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is
decided. This appears to us such an instance; we think that no more
was covered than situations substantially similar to those then at bar.
The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable.
Id. at 280. Judge Richard Posner, in Misappropriation: A Dirge, said, “[c]larity of
analysis would be enhanced if the doctrine and the very word were banished from
discussions of intellectual property law.” 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 641 (2003). The
American Law Institute also tried to put an end to the misappropriation tort. “The better
approach, and the one most likely to achieve an appropriate balance between the
competing interests, does not recognize a residual common law tort of misappropriation.”
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A major decision by the Second Circuit in Barclays Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.13 only postponed the ultimate reckoning
with a narrow holding that denied relief against the unauthorized
distribution of the plaintiffs’ stock recommendations.
The
reemergence of the misappropriation tort from the shadow of
federal copyright law is somewhat improbable, resting as it does
on a single paragraph of legislative history, extracted from an ABA
Committee Report directed at a portion of the copyright revision
bill that was never actually enacted.14 Nevertheless, the tort’s
application to news on the Internet has been cheered by numerous
commentators.15
The outcome of these disputes over the
appropriate boundaries of copyright and the viability of
misappropriation tort will determine whether facts can be freely
disseminated on the Internet. After a short review of the current
state of copyright protection for news, this article examines the
recent attempts by content providers to gain control over facts
through federal copyright law and the common law tort of
misappropriation.
I.

COPYRIGHT IN NEWS REPORTS

A. News Stories
News providers already enjoy significant legal protection for
their work. The text of news stories has long been entitled to
protection under copyright law.16 In the latest eruption over the
copying of news content on the Internet, Barclays Capital and

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995) § 38, cmt. b. As co-reporter for the
Restatement, I authored the text counseling elimination of the tort.
13
650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 303–37.
15
See infra notes 238–39.
16
“No doubt news articles often possess a literary quality, and are the subject of
literary property at the common law; nor do we question that such an article, as a literary
production, is the subject of copyright by the terms of the act as it now stands.” INS, 248
U.S. at 234. The history of copyright in news stories is explored in Robert Brauneis, The
Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate Over Copyright in News, 27
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2009). Not everyone believes that copyright is
appropriate for news stories. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Who Owns “The First Rough Draft
of History?”: Reconsidering Copyright in News, 27 COLUM. J.L & ARTS 521 (2004).
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other major financial firms sued a news service that distributed
information from the plaintiffs’ research reports to paying
customers via an online newsfeed.17 The litigation focused mainly
on the plaintiffs’ efforts to utilize the misappropriation doctrine to
prevent the defendant from reporting on their market
recommendations.18 In a few instances, however, the defendant
had also distributed summaries containing verbatim copying of key
excerpts from the plaintiffs’ research reports.19 That particular
conduct posed few legal difficulties. After abandoning an almost
certainly futile fair use defense, the defendant was held liable for
copyright infringement.20 Remedies included statutory damages,
prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction.21
Systematic republication of news stories and excerpts is
consistently held to be copyright infringement. In Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.,22 for example, a
defendant was held liable for distributing to its customers
“abstracts”—actually “rough translations”—of news articles from
the plaintiff’s financial newspapers.23
The Second Circuit
reaffirmed the defendant’s right to republish the “facts” contained
in the articles, but tracking an average of two-thirds of each article
sentence by sentence was a prima facie infringement.24
Predictably, the defendant raised a fair use defense under section
107 of the Copyright Act.25 “News reporting,” after all, is listed in
the preamble to section 107 as a use that may be amenable to fair

17

Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876.
See infra text accompanying notes 180–216.
19
Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 883–84.
20
Id. at 886.
21
See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.(Barclays I), 700 F. Supp. 2d
310, 328–31, rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). The defendant did
not appeal the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their copyright claims. See Barclays
II, 650 F.3d at 880.
22
166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999).
23
Id. at 69.
24
Id. at 71. Although a “close call,” the Second Circuit found insufficient quantitative
similarity with respect to one excerpt that copied only the first paragraph of a sixparagraph article. Id.
25
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The fair use inquiry focuses on four factors: the purpose of
the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount used by the defendant, and the
effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work. See id.
18
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use.26
The court in Nihon rejected the fair use defense,
emphasizing that the use was not “transformative” because the
defendant added nothing to the pre-existing works and its use
served the same purpose as the originals.27 The market effect
factor also “weighed strongly against fair use because Comline’s
abstracts competed directly with the Nikkei articles.”28
A similar result had been reached earlier by the same court in
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,29 when
a weekly financial newspaper included abstracts of the plaintiff’s
market research reports as a regular feature of its publication.30
The fair use defense was rejected on the grounds that the copying
was substantial in quantity and quality and reduced the economic
value of the plaintiff’s reports.31
A fair use argument is less easily dismissed when the copying
of news stories provides a forum for criticism or commentary. Los
Angeles Times v. Free Republic32 thus seems a more difficult case
than Nihon or Wainwright. Free Republic was a website that
allowed registered users to post current news articles.33 Users of
the site could then comment on the posted articles.34 The Los
Angeles Times and Washington Post claimed infringement.35 Free
Republic argued that the postings were fair use, but the defense
was rejected on summary judgment.36 Although conceding that
26

Id.
Nihon, 166 F.3d at 72.
28
Id. at 73.
29
558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
30
Id. at 94.
31
The court attempted a summary of the scope of copyright in news reports. “What is
protected is the manner of expression, the author’s analysis or interpretation of events,
the way he structures his material and marshals facts, his choice of words, and the
emphasis he gives to particular developments.” Id. at 95–96. Inclusion of “the author’s
analysis or interpretation of events” may go too far. See Harper & Row Publishers v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) (“Especially in the realm of factual narrative,
the law is currently unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements
combine with the author’s original contributions to form protected expression.”).
32
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
33
Id. at 1555; see also FREE REPUBLIC, http://www.freerepublic.com (last visited Oct.
4, 2012).
34
See L.A. Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1454.
35
See id.
36
See id.
27
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commentary was a legitimate basis for fair use, the court said that
the use reduced traffic to the plaintiffs’ own websites, resulting in
lost advertising revenue and interfering with their ability to charge
for online access.37
The court’s chief concern, however, seemed to be whether the
extent of the defendant’s use exceeded any legitimate
justification.38 The court concluded that the defendant’s purpose
of promoting public discussion could be served using only
summaries of the news articles, or by using links to the articles
themselves, which were hosted on the plaintiffs’ websites.39
The court’s analysis of economic harm and the amount of the
defendant’s use in Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic is
potentially applicable to copying by bloggers and other
commentators. But perhaps a site like Free Republic that posts
news on all subjects is a greater competitive threat to newspapers
than are blogs limited to specific topics, and the court also stressed
that the initial postings on Free Republic often consisted simply of
copied news articles, with commentary added only by other
users.40
A series of infringement actions brought by Righthaven LLC
against copiers of news articles in the Las Vegas Review-Journal
indicates that the typical blogger may fare better than Free
Republic.41 When a realtor posted an excerpt from a news story
about housing sales on his Internet blog, along with a link to the
full text, an infringement claim was dismissed on the basis of fair

37

See id. at 1471.
See id. at 1468.
39
Id. at 1464.
40
See id. at 1461.
41
Righthaven LLC, a law firm funded in part by the parent company of the Las Vegas
Review-Journal for the purpose of controlling the use of its news material on the internet,
has filed at least 250 copyright infringement suits after obtaining assignments of the
posted materials from copyright owners. See Marc John Randazza,
Copyrights/Infringement: Defense Arguments Against Righthaven Copyright Suits
Multiply But Remain Untested, 81 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 729, 729
(Apr. 1, 2011). Many of the cases have been settled, presumably due to the leverage
provided by the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §
504(c)(2) (2006) (damages up to $150,000 per infringed work for willful infringements).
38
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use.42 The purpose of the use was educational, only eight of thirty
sentences had been reproduced, and the court found that the use
was unlikely to affect the market for the news article.43
Similarly, an Internet user who posted the entire text of a news
article about public employee pensions on a website discussion
forum won summary judgment on a fair use defense.44 Since the
user’s non-commercial posting furthered discussion of state budget
issues, the court found that even “wholesale” copying did not
preclude a finding of fair use.45
In yet another case brought by Righthaven, a non-profit
organization dedicated to helping immigrants won a summary
judgment when it posted the entire text of a news article on its
website.46 The defendant’s burden on the fair use issue was eased
since Righthaven could not show any harm to the limited interest
in the copyright that had been assigned to it by the originating
newspaper.47 The court also found that use of the entire article was
reasonable given the educational purpose of the use and in order
“to give the full flavor of the information.”48
Thus, for whole articles and substantial excerpts, copyright
generally provides reliable protection to news originators against
competitive uses and, for better or for worse, imposes risks on
even non-commercial copiers that may discourage wholesale and
systematic redistribution.

42

Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1518 (D.
Nev. 2010).
43
Id.
44
Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (D. Nev. 2011). The court
also ordered dismissal of the action on the ground that Righthaven lacked standing to
bring suit, finding that the assignment from the copyright owner did not grant Righthaven
“ownership of any exclusive rights” in the work. Id. at 1146–47. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)
(“[L]egal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright is entitled . . . to
institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she
is the owner of it.”). Accord, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC,
791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (D. Nev. 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d
1265, 1271–72 (D. Colo. 2011).
45
Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149–50.
46
Righthaven LLC v. Jama, 2011 WL 1541613, at *1, *5 (D. Nev. 2011).
47
See id. at *4.
48
Id. at *3.
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B. Headlines and Leads
The most common “use” of news content on the web may be
the ubiquitous links that take users from an aggregation, blog, or
other referring web site to news content on an originator’s own
site. The link itself is not problematic under copyright law. Links
are merely instructions that direct a user’s browser to a different
web site—content is then reproduced, displayed, and distributed by
the originator’s own site.49 To be useful, however, the link must
be labeled, and in the case of news content, the most tempting and
obvious label is the headline of the news story being linked. If
headlines are copyrightable, their use to label links is a potential
infringement. Some linking aggregators and bloggers take more,
however, offering users not only a link labeled with a news
headline but also a portion of the article’s lead paragraph, written
to give readers the main idea of the story, usually with an emphasis
on attention-grabbing facts.

49
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a link to copyrighted material does not violate the display or distribution
right granted copyright owners in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5)). One type of link might be
more problematic. In an early online news case, several news companies sued a web site
that provided links to news content located on the plaintiffs’ sites. See Complaint at 8,
Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y filed Feb. 20,
1997). The “in-line” links displayed the linked content within a frame on the defendant’s
web site that covered advertising on the content owners’ sites with advertising from the
defendant’s own web site. Id. The complaint relied primarily on the common law
misappropriation tort and the case was settled on terms that allowed the defendant to link
to the plaintiffs’ content with non-framing links. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat
the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of
Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 410, 419–23 (1998). Content
owners might argue that even if “in-line” links do not infringe their reproduction, display,
or distribution rights under the holdings of cases such as Perfect 10, the user has in effect
created a new version of the copyrighted content in violation of the owner’s exclusive
right to prepare derivative works under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). See Futuredontics Inc. v.
Applied Anagramics Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005, 2006–07 (C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 152
F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (declining to dismiss a count alleging violation of the derivative
right through a framing link). However, the most appropriate response may have been
given by Judge Batts in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. When-U.com, who said that “pop-up” ads
that covered a portion of the plaintiff’s web site did not “recast, transform or adapt”
(paraphrasing the definition of “derivative work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101) the plaintiff’s web
site and thus did not create infringing derivatives works. 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
1033 (2005).
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No court has ruled on the copyrightability of news headlines
under U.S. law, although one case came tantalizingly close.50 In
2005, the French news organization Agence France-Presse filed a
suit claiming that Google’s use of the agency’s headlines, leads,
and photos on its news aggregation site infringed the agency’s
copyrights.51 The parties filed cross motions for partial summary
judgment on the issue of whether the headlines used as links by
Google were copyrightable subject matter.52 The court heard oral
arguments on the motions, but the case settled when the parties
reached a licensing agreement.53
In support of its summary judgment motion, Google offered
three reasons why news headlines should not be copyrightable.54
The first argument rested on the fact that headlines are small
works—in this case never exceeding ten words, according to the
plaintiff’s style book.55 Only “original works of authorship” are
eligible for copyright.56 The Supreme Court has interpreted that
standard to require “only that the work was independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”57 Short
works like headlines are unlikely to exhibit the requisite
creativity.58 The regulations of the Copyright Office reflect this
50

A decision by the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom recently held that
newspaper headlines could qualify as original literary works and their use as links could
be an infringement of copyright. Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Meltwater Holding BV
[2011] EWCA (Civ) 890, [16].
51
First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 28.
52
See Michael Warnecke, Copyrights/Infringement: In Battle Over Use of News
Headlines, Court Focuses on Policy Implications for Web, 71 PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 269 (2006).
53
See Copyright/Infringement: Agence France-Presse, Google Inc. Settle Copyright
Infringement Dispute, 73 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 706 (2007).
54
Google’s Motion and Memorandum for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing
Count II for Lack of Protectable Subject Matter, Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc.,
No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 17, 2005), 2005 WL 3174401.
55
See id.
56
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
57
Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
58
See, e.g., Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(phrases such as “Call for help” and “Check breathing” in CPR software are not
copyrightable); CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc. 97 F.3d 1504, 1520
(1st Cir. 1996) (phrases such as “call in, clock in, and win” not copyrightable); Magic
Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Serv. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1986)
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view, excluding from copyright registration “[w]ords and short
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or
designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or
coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents.”59
Admittedly, however, it may be possible for even a “small”
work to exceed the necessary threshold of creativity, which the
Supreme Court has characterized as “extremely low.”60 As the
leading treatise on copyright puts it, “it would seem
(notwithstanding the above quoted Copyright Office Regulation)
that even a short phrase may command copyright protection if it
exhibits sufficient creativity.”61 Thus, especially clever headlines
might sometimes make the grade, although apparently not those of
Agence France-Presse, which admitted that its headlines are not
“hardened” or “jazzed up” to be more eye-catching.62 Even
creative headlines, however, face other obstacles to protection.
Google’s memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment also made the point that headlines are factual statements
about the news.63 Facts are not eligible for copyright protection.64
Protection is limited to the way the facts are expressed.65
However, in some circumstances protection for even the literary
expression of facts may effectively prevent others from
communicating the underlying information. As Google put it, the
law should withhold copyright from expressions of facts when
necessary “to keep the ‘basic building blocks’ of public discourse

(phrases such as “Priority Message,” “Contents Require Immediate Attention” and “Gift
Check Enclosed” are not copyrightable); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.7.3 (2d ed. 2011) (“The shorter a phrase is, the less likely it is to be original and the
more likely it is to constitute an idea rather than an expression.”); 1 MELVIN B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (“The smaller the effort (e.g., two
words) the greater must be the degree of creativity in order to claim copyright
protection.”).
59
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010).
60
See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
61
1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at 9.
62
Google’s Motion and Mem., supra note 54, at 2.
63
See id. at 3.
64
See infra Part II.
65
See infra text accompanying note 157.
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freely available.”66 This is in essence an appeal to the copyright
doctrine of merger. As explained by one court:
Under the copyright law doctrine of merger, a close
cousin to the idea/expression dichotomy, copyright
protection will be denied to even some expressions
of ideas if the idea behind the expression is such
that it can be expressed only in a very limited
number of ways. The doctrine is designed to
prevent an author from monopolizing an idea
merely by copyrighting a few expressions of it.67
If copyright protection were freely extended to headlines, the
possible non-infringing headline variations for a particular news
story might well be used up, leaving subsequent writers with no
choice but to risk infringement of a previously copyrighted
version.68
Google offered an additional argument against copyright in
headlines, even creative ones. As the Copyright Office regulation
illustrates, titles have traditionally been excluded from copyright
protection.69 Agence France-Presse responded that “headlines are
parts of stories, not identifiers like titles,”70 but the distinction
between “headlines” and “titles” is unconvincing. A book or
movie title is as much a part of that work as a news headline,
and—more to the point—the headline is often the only practical
way of identifying a particular news article. For example, The
Bluebook citation form for news articles includes the “title”—

66

Google’s Motion and Mem., supra note 54, at 3(a).
Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
68
Professor Alfred Yen has drawn a similar conclusion: “Courts would therefore
probably deny copyright to many headlines under the principle of merger.” Alfred C.
Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of Legislation Treating News Aggregation
as Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 947, 956 (2010).
69
See, e.g., 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, at 2:101 (“Courts have universally held that
titles of works are not copyrightable.”); 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.16 (“It is
nevertheless clear, as a matter of statutory construction by the courts (as well as
Copyright Office Regulations), that titles may not claim statutory copyright.”).
70
Response in Opposition to Google, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
5, Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005)
2002WL 3174409 [hereinafter Response in Opposition].
67
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presumably the headline—of the article.71 If headlines—serving as
titles and distinguishing one news story from another—are
copyrightable, every subsequent reference to the news story would
become a prima facie infringement. A per se rule excluding
headlines from copyright would also avoid a headline-by-headline
evaluation of creativity and merger, thus creating a safe harbor for
headline links.
Although not included within the scope of the summary
judgment motions, Agence France-Presse had also complained
about Google’s use of leads from the agency’s news articles.72
Lead paragraphs afford more space for the creative intellectual
effort necessary for copyright,73 thus presenting a stronger case for
copyright than headlines. Protection for leads is also less likely to
present problems of merger since the possible variations in
expression expand with the increased size of a work. Perhaps
more importantly the use of leads, unlike headlines, is not
necessary to identify a particular news story. Whether copying all
or a portion of a lead paragraph is an infringement can only be
determined case by case. In one such case, the Second Circuit held
that copying the first paragraph of a six-paragraph news article did
not produce the “substantial similarity” necessary for
infringement.74
Even if a newspaper succeeds in arguing that the headlines or
leads copied by an aggregator are copyrighted, it will still likely
face the inevitable fair use defense. The extent to which the
defendant’s use is “transformative” plays a key role in assessing
“the purpose and character of the use” under the first statutory fair
use factor.75 Two Ninth Circuit cases involving image search
71

THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 16.6, at 151 (Columbia Law
Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
72
See Response in Opposition, supra note 70, at 6.
73
See generally Melvin Mencher, The Lead, NEWS REPORTING AND WRITING,
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/isaacs/client_edit/Mencher.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2012) (explaining the different ways in which to write a lead).
74
See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir.
1999) (“a close call”).
75
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (explaining
that the first fair use factor “asks . . . whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’ Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
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engines concluded that the use of thumbnail images by search
engines is a transformative, rather than a superseding, use of the
original images, since such use serves a different purpose than the
original expression by transforming the images into pointers that
assist in accessing information.76 The same could be said about
headline links. Newspapers might argue that unlike the lowresolution thumbnail images in the search engine cases, the use of
headlines as links can be a superseding use since the headline may
be sufficient in itself to satisfy the reader’s desire for information.
However, characterizing a headline link as a superseding use is
problematic even when readers choose not to click through to the
original content. Rather than using the headline as a substitute for
the original content, it may be more accurate to say that those
readers have simply decided that they are not interested in the
original content.
The “purpose and character of the use” factor also directs
courts to consider whether the “use is of a commercial nature.”77
If money is made by exploiting a copyrighted work, the copyright
owner has a natural claim to the proceeds. Many news aggregation
sites, and even many blogs, are commercial enterprises supported
by advertising or subscription fees.78 However, unlike traditional
commercial uses, the exploitation here is more attenuated since the
linking site is not directly selling copies of the copyrighted
works.79 In addition, the more transformative the use, the weaker
the copyright owner’s claim to any proceeds generated by the

finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”) (citations and footnote omitted).
76
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003).
77
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
78
See, e.g., Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818 (“Arriba operates its web site for commercial
purposes.”).
79
See id. (reasoning that although the image search engine’s use was commercial, “it
was more incidental and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types of use”
since the defendant “was neither using [plaintiff’s] images to directly promote its web
site nor trying to profit by selling [plaintiff’s] images”); cf. Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995)
(finding the link between the defendant photocopier’s business profits and the copying
“somewhat attenuated” and not “commercial exploitation” although acknowledging “at
least some indirect economic advantage” from the copying).
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use.80 Both factors may help to neutralize the commercial nature
of an aggregator’s use. In the end, the public benefit in improving
access to information on the Internet may suffice to tilt the balance
of the first fair use factor toward the defendants.81
Little is usually made of the second fair use factor—“the nature
of the copyrighted work”82—unless the work is unpublished or is,
as in the news context, a factual work.83 The latter circumstance
typically elicits a statement that the scope of fair use is broader for
factual works in light of the heightened public interest in
dissemination.84
The third factor in section 107—the “amount and substantiality
of the use”85—includes a qualitative as well as a quantitative
assessment of the defendant’s use.86 Although headlines and leads
are quantitatively small, newspapers can be expected to argue that
they are the heart of a news story and that their reproduction thus
weighs heavily against a fair use defense. Courts have held that
the amount of use, however, should not be evaluated in the
abstract, but instead in relation to the amount that is necessary to
effectuate the defendant’s legitimate fair use purposes.87 The use

80
See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.”); Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1166–67 (finding Google’s transformative
use of images as thumbnails outweighed the fact that the use was commercial); Kelly, 336
F.3d at 818.
81
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (noting the “social benefit” of electronic reference
tools); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (noting that the use of the thumbnail images “benefit the
public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the internet”).
82
17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
83
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553–56 (1985).
84
See id. at 563 (“The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual
works than works of fiction or fantasy.”).
85
17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
86
See Harper, 471 U.S. at 564–65.
87
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994) (“[W]e
recognize that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of
the use.”); Chicago Bd. of Ed. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) (“[T]he fair use copier must copy no more than is reasonably
necessary (not strictly necessary—room must be allowed for judgment, and judges must
not police criticism with a heavy hand) to enable him to pursue an aim that the law
recognizes as proper . . . .”); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820–21 (“[T]he extent of permissible
copying varies with the purpose and character of the use. If the secondary user only
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of headlines seems indispensable to the links that assist users to
access desired news content. Leads, however, are less directly
related to that purpose, and come closer instead to substituting for
the copyrighted content. Copying leads may tilt this factor toward
copyright owners.
The final fair use factor considers the effect of the use on the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.88 Typically,
it will be impossible for content owners to tie a decrease in the
market for print versions of their works to an aggregator’s or
blogger’s use of headlines or leads taken from the owner’s online
site.89 Content owners are more likely to claim that the use affects
revenues related specifically to their online sites, primarily lost
advertising revenue caused by a drop in traffic to their sites.90
However, the impact of aggregation on web site traffic is
unclear. One study found that 44% of Google News users failed to
click through to any of the original content after scanning the
headlines,91 but there was no estimate of how many of those users
would have otherwise visited the originating sites. Some of the
many who did follow links to originating web sites might not have
otherwise visited those sites.92 Net gains or losses are difficult to
estimate.93 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that aggregation
sites and blogs may increase traffic and potential advertising
revenues for news sites.94 Moreover, there are now technical
means to prevent search engines and aggregators from

copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor will not weigh
against him or her.”) (footnote omitted).
88
17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
89
See Erick Schonfeld, The Media Bundle is Dead, Long Live The News Aggregators,
(in small caps) TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/08/16/themedia-bundle-is-dead-long-live-the-news-aggregators.
90
See id.
91
See Robin Wauters, Report: 44% of Google News Visitors Scan Headlines, Don’t
Click Through, TechCrunch (Jan. 19, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/19/outsellgoogle-news (reporting on the research firm Outsell’s News Users’ report).
92
See Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Copyright, Digitization, and Aggregation, 1,
3 (Dec. 17, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1864203.
93
See id.
94
See id. at 2–3.
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automatically crawling a web site to index or extract its content.95
The fact that most news sites do not block such web crawling may
indicate that the sites have at least tentatively concluded that they
are better off being aggregated than not.96 Similarly, when The
New York Times announced that it was limiting the number of
articles that readers could read each month for free on its web site,
the policy specifically excluded articles reached by readers through
search engines and other links.97
Another source of potential economic harm that owners might
attribute to aggregation and blogging is the loss of revenue from
licensing those uses of their content. There is an obvious problem
with taking lost licensing revenue into account in evaluating fair
use, since copyright owners can always claim that any
unauthorized use deprived them of the revenue they would
otherwise have received for licensing the use. With that in mind,
courts have considered lost licensing revenues only when a
traditional derivative market already exists or is likely to be
developed and have excluded markets for transformatively
different uses.98 The lost licensing revenue argument is thus weak
with respect to the transformative use of headlines as links to the
news stories that they designate. The use of leads by aggregators,
however, is less transformative and less necessary, and a licensing
market involving content owners and aggregators apparently

95

Josh Cohen, Working with News Publishers, Google Public Policy Blog (July 15,
2009, 2:25 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/07/working-with-newspublishers.html; see Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006)
(referring to expert testimony explaining how a web site publisher can prevent a search
engine from caching its site).
96
The court in Field goes further, concluding that the failure of a web site owner to
use technical means to prevent search engines from indexing and caching the site
constitutes an implied license to make such use. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
97
Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., A Letter to Our Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A26.
(“Readers who come to Times articles through links from search engines, blogs and
social media will be able to read those articles, even if they have reached their monthly
reading limit. This allows new and casual readers to continue to discover our content on
the open Web.”).
98
See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d
Cir. 2006).
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already exists.99 On this factor too, the use of leads presents a
weaker claim to fair use than headlines.
Thus, even if the use of headlines as links is a prima facie
infringement, a fair use defense is likely to prevail. When a
headline is used to identify a link and not merely to convey its
factual content, the use seems transformative. The use involves a
work of fact and takes no more than necessary to fulfill what seems
a legitimate fair use purpose, while the economic effect remains
open to question. For leads, the closest comparison is not to
headlines but to the use of excerpts or complete news stories,
leaving the outcome on fair use to be determined case by case.
II. COPYRIGHT IN FACTS
Suppose that an aggregator or blogger reproduces neither the
text of a news story nor its headline or lead, taking instead only
facts reported in the article, such as the particular investment rating
given by a financial analyst to a specific bond or stock. That
should not be a problem under copyright law—at least if Congress,
the United States Supreme Court, and the leading commentators on
copyright are to be believed.100 But what then should be made of
99

Chiou & Tucker, supra note 92, at 5.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act prohibits copyright protection for “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). The statutory language was clearly intended to subsume
information. “Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information
revealed by the author’s work.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985) (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to
those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s
originality.”) (citation omitted); id. at 556 (“No author may copyright his ideas or the
facts he narrates.”); Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)
(“That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”); INS, 248 U.S.
215, 234 (1918) (“It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they
empowered Congress ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries’ (Const. art. 1, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to
be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the
knowledge of it.”). The leading commentators on copyright agree. “The courts have
denied copyright protection not only to historical facts, but also to facts set out in
biographical works, in news stories, and in other forms of expression.” 1 NIMMER, supra
note 58, § 2.11; “[N]o amount of effort in researching, collecting or producing data will
100
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the cryptic remark in Judge Cote’s opinion in Barclays Capital Inc.
v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., discussing the copyrightability of
equity research recommendations produced by the plaintiff equity
firms:
It is also worth bearing in mind that the
Recommendations are not objective facts, but
rather, subjective judgments based on complex and
imperfect evidence.
In this sense, the
Recommendations produced by the Firms represent
the kinds of information to which the Court of
Appeals has seen fit to extend copyright protection
under copyright laws. Such information has been
described as “soft facts” or “soft ideas infused with
taste or opinion,” and explicitly includes items such
as subjective valuations or target prices.101
This comment acknowledges a major but underappreciated
threat to the basic tenet of copyright law that individual facts are
not protected.102 The heresy can be traced to the Second Circuit’s
opinion in CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter
Market Reports, Inc.103 That case and its progeny undermine the
fundamental premise of copyright law that protection extends only
to the manner in which an author expresses her ideas and
information but not to the ideas and information themselves.104
CCC Information was a declaratory judgment action brought
by the owner of a computer database seeking to establish its
freedom to copy portions of Maclean’s Automobile Red Book
(“Red Book”), which contained projected values for various

of itself qualify the results of that effort for copyright protection.” 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 58, § 2.14.
101
Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir.
2011).
102
Collections of facts can be protected as compilations if they exhibit sufficient
creativity in the selection and arrangement of the individual facts. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 103,
101 (2006) (definition of “compilation”). See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
103
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995). In fact, Judge Cote’s quotation cites to this
case. See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
104
1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.03 [D].
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models of used cars in different geographic markets.105 Maclean
counterclaimed for copyright infringement.106 Relying on section
103 of the Copyright Act, which recognizes copyright in
“compilations,”107 and on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,108 which
recognized creativity in the selection and arrangement of data, the
court held that the Red Book as a whole was copyrightable as a
compilation.109
The court found that “the selection and
arrangement of data in the Red Book displayed amply sufficient
originality to pass the low threshold requirement to earn copyright
protection,”110 referring to the originality in the division of car
values into separate regional markets, the selection of optional
vehicle features to consider, the adjustment of values for mileage
in 5,000 mile increments, and the selection of the model years to
include in the compilation.111 So far, so good. But the usually
sure-handed Judge Leval,112 chastising the district court for
holding that the Red Book was uncopyrightable, ranged well
beyond originality in the selection and arrangement of the Red
Book’s data, drawing a dubious distinction between “discovered”
facts and estimates or predictions:
The district court was simply mistaken in its
conclusion that the Red Book valuations were, like
the telephone numbers in Feist, pre-existing facts
that had merely been discovered by the Red Book
editors. To the contrary, Maclean’s evidence
demonstrated without rebuttal that its valuations
were neither reports of historical prices nor
mechanical derivations of historical prices or other
data. Rather, they represented predictions by Red
Book editors of future prices estimated to cover
105

See CCC Info., 44 F.3d. at 67.
See id. at 64.
107
17 U.S.C. § 103.
108
Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
109
See CCC Info., 44 F.3d at 72.
110
Id. at 67.
111
See id.
112
See, e.g., Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990) (arguing against a bright-line standard for fair use).
106
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specified geographic regions. . . . The valuations
themselves are original creations of Maclean.113
When, in CDN Inc. v. Kapes, the publisher of a newsletter on
coin prices complained that a coin dealer was using its prices on
the dealer’s web page, the Ninth Circuit, citing CCC Information,
enthusiastically and unambiguously fell into line behind the
Second Circuit.114 Unlike the claim in CCC Information, the
copyright owner here did not allege infringement of its compilation
of prices, and thus originality in the selection or arrangement of the
coin prices was not an issue.115 “Rather, the issue in this case is
whether the prices themselves are sufficiently original as
compilations to sustain a copyright.”116 The court held that they
were.117 In its analysis, the court focused on the subjective process
of creating a price list, reasoning “[w]hat is important is the fact
that both Maclean and CDN arrive at the prices they list through a
process that involves using their judgment to distill and extrapolate
from factual data.”118
The defendant also raised a merger argument, asserting that
even if the number used to express a coin’s price were
copyrightable, the idea of the coin’s value can only be expressed
through the use of that number and barring copying would thus
impermissibly confer a monopoly over the idea itself.119 As with
113

CCC Info., 44 F.3d at 67. Any uncertainty over the implications of the court’s
comments was removed by a footnote that added, “[o]riginal authorship warranting
protection” can be fixed in the form of numbers, citing the Copyright Act’s definition of
“literary works” in 107 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Id. at 67 n.6. At least one court had
preceded the Second Circuit in recognizing copyright in individual valuations. Marshall
& Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mich. 1994), involved a claim to
copyright in the values appearing in tables of cost estimates for building construction
used by appraisers. Plaintiff argued “that the content of the tables is protectible
expression because it is opinion; that the numbers in the tables represent an appraisal or
estimate of value.” Id. at 959. The court agreed, finding that the plaintiff had “more than
adequately supported its contention that judgment and selection are components of its
creative process,” despite “an apparent lack of case precedent affording copyright
protection to the same type of material.” Id. at 960.
114
See CDN Inc., v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1999).
115
See id. at 1259.
116
Id.
117
See id. at 1262.
118
Id. at 1261.
119
Id.
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all merger arguments, the crucial step came in defining the “idea”
that should remain available to the defendant and the public.120
The court sided with plaintiff CDN, stating that “CDN does not,
nor could it, claim protection for its idea of creating a wholesale
price guide, but it can use the copyright laws to protect its idea of
what those prices are.”121 Somehow, the coin values were not the
kind of “facts” that Congress and the Supreme Court had placed
beyond the reach of copyright.
Soon after CCC Information and CDN, a young assistant
professor at the University of Alabama offered a direct and
forceful refutation of the distinction between “discovered” and socalled “soft” facts, concluding that the two cases were
fundamentally inconsistent with Feist’s unambiguous bar to
copyright in facts.122 Evidently few people listened. Some years
later, though, the Second Circuit did make a half-hearted retreat
from CCC Information in New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v.
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.,123 calling CCC Information’s
determination that the individual car prices were copyrightable
“arguably dicta” since the court had also found that the copyright
in the Red Book as a compilation had been infringed.124
Nevertheless, faced with a claim of copyright in the daily
settlement prices of commodities futures contracts, the court in
N.Y. Mercantile felt compelled to distinguish the car prices in CCC
Information. According to the court, car prices are “created”
predictions.125 “In contrast, settlement prices can be seen as ‘preexisting facts’ about the outside world which are discovered from
actual market activity.”126 While acknowledging that “it is a
difficult line to draw,” the majority believed “there is a strong

120

Id.
Id. at 1262.
122
See Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality
Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST .L.J. 791, 842–43 (2001); see also Dan L. Burk,
Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 598–600 (2007).
123
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.
2007).
124
Id. at 115 n.5.
125
Id. (finding that the car prices were based on predictions for “average” cars that “did
not exist”).
126
Id.
121
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argument that, like the census taker, NYMEX does not ‘author’ the
settlement prices as the term is used in copyright law.”127 A final
decision on copyrightability was unnecessary, according to the
court, since protection would in any event be barred by the merger
doctrine.128 “It is undisputed that all possible expression takes the
same form, a number.”129 A prohibition on copying would thus
effectively protect the idea itself.
Although attracting little attention, inroads into the
accessibility of facts under the banner of CCC Information and
CDN have continued. In one case, ratings of hospital services
were protected as “expressions created,” distinguishing the
“discovered” facts excluded under Feist;130 in another, investment
recommendations were declared not facts but “original” works
since they were the product of professional judgment.131 One court
opined that copyright could be based on creativity “in the
production of the data compiled,” although it ultimately rested its
decision on creativity in the selection and arrangement of the
data.132 Four-digit numbers used to indicate the load ratings of ball
bearings were excluded from copyright only after a district court
judge made a factual finding that the amount of “judgment”
exercised in choosing the factors that determined the ratings was
“minimal”—in other words, more like the settlement prices in N.Y.
Mercantile than the car values in CCC Information.133 Another
recent case fashioned a test for the protectability of “final
values”—indices of financial market performance—based on the

127

Id. at 114. A concurring judge thought the settlement prices were no different than
used car values and protectable under the standard announced in CCC Information. Id. at
120 (Hall, J., concurring in part).
128
See id. at 116.
129
Id. at 118.
130
Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1234 (D. Colo. 2009). See also National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 2012 WL
6444226 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (scouting grades given to college football players held
copyrightable). The ambiguous copyright status of “ratings” is considered in James
Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 851
(2012).
131
Agora Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 503 (D. Md. 2010).
132
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236, 1239–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
133
RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22–23 (D. Conn.
2009), aff’d, 410 Fed. Appx. 362 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Second Circuit’s decisions in CCC Information and N.Y.
Mercantile.134
[T]o demonstrate that the final values produced
from raw data are protectable by copyright, a
plaintiff must demonstrate either that (1) the raw
data used to create the final value were protectable;
or (2) the method of converting the raw data into a
final value was an original (but not necessarily
novel) process that is neither widely accepted as
objective, nor an industry standard; or (3) the final
value did not attempt to measure an empirical
reality.135
We now seem a long way from the basic principle that facts are
not protected by copyright.
This extension of copyright into the realm of information rests
on a faulty distinction between “hard” or “discovered” facts and
“soft” or “created” ones. The Supreme Court in Feist explained
the exclusion of facts by invoking the originality requirement:
“[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.”136 It used
census data as an example, arguing that census takers “do not
‘create’ the population figures that emerge from their efforts,” and
hence their data is not “original” as required for copyright.137 The
line of cases emanating from CCC Information limits the
prohibition in Feist to “pre-existing” facts that are “discovered” by
their presenter, leaving facts that reflect the subjective judgment of
a creator, like the estimated values of used cars or coins, within the
scope of copyright protection.138
134

BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 604–05.
136
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
137
Id. at 347.
138
I may bear some responsibility for this development. The census data example used
by the Supreme Court to explain the exclusion of facts from copyright was taken from an
article I published in the Columbia Law Review. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in
Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 516, 525 (1981). The example was not intended to distinguish among
kinds of facts, “hard,” “soft,” or otherwise. There is no indication in Feist that the
Supreme Court understood the example in the narrow sense adopted by the cases
distinguishing “hard” and “soft” facts.
135
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The distinction between “discovered” and “created” facts
seems wrong for at least two reasons. First, even the census data
invoked in Feist is the product of subjective and creative choices.
For example, should summer residents or students at the local
college be included in a town’s population?
What of
undocumented immigrants, or military personnel living at the local
air base? How should we deal with persons who are born or die or
move in or out of town during the course of the counting period?139
Judge Easterbrook sensibly opined that Einstein’s E=mc2 expresses
a fact and is thus not copyrightable,140 but even that apparently
“hard” and “discovered” fact is actually an interpretation of
observed events that may, like Newton’s F=ma, prove to be only a
brilliant estimate of some deeper reality. The census data excluded
from copyright in Feist is not different in any fundamental way
from the car or coin prices, hospital ratings, or investment
recommendations protected in more recent cases.
Reliance on a distinction between “discovered” and “created”
facts also seems flawed in another way. In most of the “created”
fact cases, the defendants were interested in disseminating not
simply a price, or rating, or recommendation, but rather the fact
that the plaintiff had calculated or awarded that price, rating, or
recommendation. In other words, the relevant fact is not that a
particular used car is worth $5,000, or that a hospital has a threestar pediatrics unit, or that a stock is now rated as “buy.” The facts
that the defendants sought to disseminate were the fact that the
plaintiff’s Red Book lists a car’s value at $5,000, the fact that the
Health Grades rating service gave the pediatrics unit a three-star
rating, and the fact that Barclays Capital rates a certain stock as
“buy.” Viewed in this light, the relevant facts are at least as “hard”
and “discoverable” as any census data. The estimates or ratings
themselves may seem “soft,” but the fact that the plaintiff assigned
that particular estimate or rating is “hard” and “discoverable.”
A distinction between “hard” and “soft” facts is also not itself
sufficient to secure copyright for the latter “works.” As with any
work, “soft” facts must still satisfy the statutory prerequisites for
139
140

See Durham, supra note 122, at 838–39.
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997).
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copyright—fixation, independent creation, and sufficient creativity
to constitute a work of authorship—the latter two requirements
subsumed in Feist under the label of “originality.”141 Neither
fixation in a tangible form nor independent creation is typically at
issue in the “soft” fact cases. The problematic hurdle is
“creativity.” The “works” at issue, after all, are short phrases like
“Exxon/Mobil—Buy” or “Plains General Pediatrics—3 Stars” or
“Fine 1895 Barber Dime—$205.” On their face, these “works”
seem to fall short of even the “minimal level of creativity”
demanded by the Supreme Court in Feist.
The “soft” fact cases, however, find the requisite creativity not
in the expression of the information, but rather in the process that
generated it. The Ninth Circuit in CDN, for example, found that
the “process” used by the plaintiff to generate the coin values
“satisfies the ‘minimal degree of creativity’ demanded by the
Constitution for copyright protection.”142
Similarly, health
services ratings were held copyrightable as “the product of a
creative and original process.”143 Another court suggested that
“copyright . . . may be afforded compilations if there is a minimum
level of creativity, either in the production of the data compiled or
in the selection and arrangement.”144
There is a straightforward rebuttal to this line of reasoning.
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act specifically excludes from
copyright any “idea, procedure, process, system, [or] method of
operation,” presumably even creative ones.145
Copyright
141

“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1
NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.01 [A], [B]).
142
CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1999). The court in CCC
Information looked to the “multitude of data sources” and the “professional judgment and
expertise” in concluding that the used car “valuations themselves are original creations of
[plaintiff].” CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67
(2d Cir. 1994).
143
Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1235 (D. Colo. 2009). See also National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 2012 WL
6444226 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (scouting grades for college football players held
copyrightable as reflecting a creative weighing of subjective factors).
144
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
145
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
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protection for “soft” facts thus cannot rest on creativity in the
procedure, process, system, or method used to produce them.146
Several courts have recognized this. The Sixth Circuit in ATC
Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission &
Parts, Inc.,147 a case about copying numbers used for transmission
parts, held that the parts classification system created by the
plaintiff was not copyrightable despite its creativity.148 Citing the
bar to copyright for ideas in section 102(b), the court said that the
scheme could not be protected,149 because “all of the creative
aspects of the [plaintiff’s] classification scheme are just that:
ideas.”150
The Third Circuit’s en banc decision in Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp.151 similarly held that a numbering system for
fasteners was not subject to copyright.152 “[B]ecause ideas may
not be copyrighted, [plaintiff] does not assert any claim of
copyright in its numbering system, but instead focuses on the part
numbers themselves.”153 Copyright must rest on the attributes of
the generated expression itself, not on the attributes of the system
or process responsible for that expression. E=mc2 is the product of
remarkable creativity, but it is not copyrightable. Protection for
the underlying idea is barred by section 102(b) and protection for
the formula itself as an expression of that idea is not available
because, unlike a textual description of special relativity, the
formula lacks the minimum level of creative expression required
for copyright.154
There is yet another objection to recognizing copyright in
output based on creativity in the production process. Users who

146

See Burk, supra note 122, at 598–600; Durham, supra note 122, at 807–08.
402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005).
148
See id. at 710–12.
149
Id. at 707.
150
Id.
151
390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 813 (2005).
152
See id. at 282
153
Id.
154
Even if the equation’s expression satisfied the required standard of creativity,
protection would almost certainly be barred by the merger doctrine since copyright in the
equation would effectively prevent access to the underlying idea. See infra text
accompanying notes 171–73.
147
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have access only to the resulting data cannot make an informed
judgment about its protectability. The expression they see may
seem too minimal to merit copyright, but, unable to judge the
creativity of the underlying process, they cannot evaluate the
likelihood or reasonableness of an assertion of copyright. The
situation seems roughly analogous to the line of cases that denies
copyright protection to fictional material that the author has
presented as fact.155 The public interest in access to facts cautions
against requiring users to guess as to the legal status of the
information.156
The Supreme Court reiterated in Feist that an “author can claim
originality, if at all, only in the way the facts are presented.”157
How do the claims of copyright in the “soft” facts cases fare when
attention is focused not on the process that produced the data, but
on the manner in which the results are expressed? The short
phrases used to express car or coin values, investment
recommendations, or health service ratings are almost certainly too
trivial to reach the level of creativity required for copyright.158 The
creativity involved in crafting such small works presumably falls
short of even the “minimal degree of creativity” demanded by
Feist.159 After refusing to recognize copyright in the systems that
produced the plaintiffs’ parts numbers, both ATC Distribution
Group and Southco held that the numbers themselves did not
exhibit sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection.160 The
latter case made the point that since the parts numbers were
dictated by the plaintiff’s numbering system, the numbers
155
See, e.g., Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Oliver v.
Saint Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 1941). Oliver is an odd case, even for
California. The defendant was permitted to appropriate material from a copyrighted
work because it had been represented by the plaintiff as the revelations of a deceased
entity from another world. Id. at 299.
156
See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
plaintiff was estopped from claiming copyright in material represented as fact, even if
reasonable readers might not believe the representation).
157
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991).
158
See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010), quoted in text accompanying note 59 supra.
159
See cases cited supra note 58.
160
ATC Distribution Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 709 (6th Cir. 2005); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge, Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 282 (3d
Cir. 2004).
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themselves reflected no creativity at all.161 Both opinions also
alluded to another reason for caution in recognizing copyright in
“small” works.162 Copyright in works like numbers, words, or
short phrases imposes costs on subsequent users, who, if
threatened, may have to bear the costs and risks of proving
independent creation or fair use.
One “soft” fact case involving health services ratings
specifically rejected a defense premised on the Copyright Office
regulation excluding copyright in “words and short phrases,”
arguing that copyrightable expression should not be denied
protection merely because it consists of a short phrase.163 As a
general proposition, the statement has merit,164 but as the primary
treatise on copyright law cautions, “[t]he smaller the effort (e.g.,
two words) the greater must be the degree of creativity in order to
claim copyright protection.”165 However, the only “originality”
cited by the court to support protection for the health service
ratings was the creativity of the process that produced them.166
The manner in which the ratings were expressed seems both trivial
and, perhaps more importantly, dictated by the ratings process
itself.
There is yet another objection to copyright in “soft” facts.
Even if the expression of the fact somehow achieves the minimum
standard of creativity necessary for copyright, protection will
almost always be barred by the merger doctrine. Ho v. Taflove167
is an excellent example. A professor claimed infringement of the
copyright in notes relating to a model of electron behavior.168 The
Seventh Circuit held that the model itself was an idea and thus not
subject to copyright.169 As for the expression of the idea in an
equation, figures, and text, the court invoked the merger
161

See Southco, 390 F.3d at 282.
See Distribution Group, 402 F.3d at 709; Southco, 390 F.3d at 286.
163
Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc. 634 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 2009).
164
See 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.01 [B].
165
Id.
166
Health Grades, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
167
648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2011).
168
See id. at 494.
169
Id. at 498.
162
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doctrine.170 “Under the merger doctrine, when ‘there is only one
feasible way of expressing an idea, so that if the expression were
copyrightable it would mean that the idea was copyrightable,’ the
expression is not protected.”171 The court concluded that “the
equation, figures and text are the only ways to express this idea,
and so, under the merger doctrine, these expressions are not
copyrightable.”172 Thus, even when the expression used to
communicate the outcomes claimed as “soft” facts exhibits the
creativity necessary for copyright, protection will still be
inappropriate whenever there is no other way to convey the
information.173
An incentive rationale is sometimes invoked to justify
protection for “soft” facts.
The Second Circuit in CCC
Information, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,
expressed a general concern that without financial incentives,
creators “might direct their energies elsewhere.”174 In a later case,
the same court supported its refusal to recognize copyright in the
settlement prices of commodities futures contracts by noting that
since the plaintiff was required to establish settlement prices by
law and business necessity, there was no need for the additional
incentive of copyright.175 Professor Justin Hughes has offered a
detailed justification for copyright in certain “created” or
“authored” facts premised on a desire to insure sufficient incentive
for their production.176 He distinguishes the settlement prices in
N.Y. Mercantile and the parts numbers in Southco from the car and
coin prices in CCC Information and CDN, justifying copyright
protection in the latter cases as a means to promote creation of the
works.177 Although perhaps sound policy, this approach is
170

See id. at 499.
Id. at 497 (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 928
(7th Cir. 2003)).
172
Id. at 497.
173
See, e.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
118 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1259 (2008).
174
44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
175
See N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 497 F.3d at 118.
176
See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 108 (2007).
177
Id. at 105.
171
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inconsistent with the basic structure of the Copyright Act.
Analogous incentive-based arguments could be offered to justify
protection for all facts—we might get more of them if they were
copyrightable. The store of good ideas might similarly increase if
they too were offered the incentive of copyright.178 The Copyright
Act, however, is not a general prohibition against appropriation.179
It is an intricate balance of incentive and access, and facts are
explicitly placed beyond its reach.
Facts, “soft” or otherwise, should not be protected by
copyright. The informational content should be available to all.
The expression used to communicate individual facts is protectable
only to the extent that the expression itself, divorced from the
process that generated the fact, satisfies the prerequisites for
copyright. A short statement or number will almost never exhibit
the requisite creativity. Even when it does, that expression is
typically the only way to communicate the underlying information
and protection should be barred by the merger doctrine.
Unfortunately, there is a theory other than copyright aimed
more directly at the protection of facts—a discredited common law
doctrine with a checkered history extending back almost a century.
Barclays Capital and other recent cases have sought to resurrect it
as a means of controlling facts on the Internet. That threat may far
exceed the potential harm of the “soft” fact copyright cases.
III. MISAPPROPRIATION
A. The “Hot News” Tort
When Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and
other giant equity firms sued Theflyonthewall.com (“Fly”) for
distributing the firms’ securities recommendations (obtained by
Fly from mainstream media reports, individual traders, and
178

Durham, supra note 122, at 828–29.
“It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by
others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this
is not ‘some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.’ It is, rather, ‘the essence of
copyright,’ and a constitutional requirement.” Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (citation omitted).
179
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insiders) on its online subscription newsfeed,180 copyright played
only a minor role. Fly had already stopped reproducing excerpts
from the firms’ research reports, and at trial Fly did not contest its
liability for previous infringements.181 Instead the firms mainly
relied on New York’s common law tort of misappropriation, a
doctrine invariably traced to the United States Supreme Court’s
1918 federal common law decision in International News Service
v. Associated Press.182 Every student of intellectual property law
can recite the facts from memory. The Associated Press (“AP”)
operated a large and expensive news reporting network in Europe
during World War I, providing stories about the war to its 950
member newspapers, which financed AP’s news-gathering efforts
through their membership fees.183 International News Services
(“INS”) (which had been denied the use of British transmission
facilities by the Allies for alleged censorship violations),184 took to
copying the war news from early east coast editions of AP
newspapers and transmitting rewritten stories to some 400 INS
papers around the country.185 AP sought an injunction against this
“unfair competition.”186 The district court, although enjoining INS
from inducing AP newspapers and their employees to provide the
news to INS prior to publication, deferred to the appellate court on
the issue of copying news from publicly available AP
newspapers.187 The Circuit Court of Appeals directed the trial
court to issue a broader injunction barring INS from appropriating
the substance of AP’s news until its commercial value had
passed.188 The injunction was affirmed by the Supreme Court189 in
180

See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir.
2011).
181
See id. at 328.
182
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
183
See id. at 229.
184
See International News Barred from Britain: New York Agency is Accused of
“Padding” Cablegrams from London, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1916, at 11, quoted in
EDMUND W. KITCH & HaRVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION 20–21 (5th ed. 1998).
185
See INS, 248 U.S. at 238, 249.
186
Id. at 215.
187
Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), modified,
245 F. 244 (C.C.A.2 1917), aff’d, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
188
Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 253 (C.C.A.2 1917), aff’d, 248
U.S. 215 (1918).
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an opinion characterized by the district court in Barclays as
“strongly influenced by several policy ideals: a ‘sweat-of-thebrow’ or ‘labor’ theory of property; norms of commercial morality
and fair dealing; and a utilitarian desire to preserve incentives to
produce socially useful services.”190
Noting that the INS rationale had been adopted “most
enthusiastically in New York,”191 Judge Cote turned to the
dominant precedent on New York misappropriation law—the
Second Circuit’s decision in National Basketball Association v.
Motorola, Inc.192 There, the NBA had sued the manufacturer of a
hand-held pager that displayed real time information on NBA
189

INS, 248 U.S. at 215
Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir.
2011). Judge Cote’s discussion of INS included the following quotation from the
Supreme Court’s opinion:
The fault in the reasoning [of defendant] lies in applying as a test the
right of the complainant as against the public, instead of considering
the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as
between themselves. The right of the purchaser of a single
newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any
legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with complainant’s
right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that
news for commercial use, in competition with complainant—which is
what defendant has done and seeks to justify—is a very different
matter. In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is
taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and
which is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in
appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where
it has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are
competitors of complainant’s members is appropriating to itself the
harvest of those who have sown. Stripped of all disguises, the
process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal
operation of complainant’s legitimate business precisely at the point
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion
of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not;
with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the
fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering
the news. The transaction speaks for itself and a court of equity
ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in
business.
Id. at 331–32 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 239–40.).
191
Id. at 332.
192
See id.
190
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basketball games.193 The game statistics were gathered by
defendants’ employees from radio and television broadcasts of the
games and relayed to a central computer for transmission to the
defendants’ customers.194
The district court had issued a
permanent injunction based on a misappropriation cause of
action.195 On appeal, the Second Circuit said that the central issue
was whether the NBA’s misappropriation claim was preempted by
federal copyright law—more on that issue later.196 In language
subsequently quoted by the district court in Barclays,197 the court
proceeded to list the elements of a state misappropriation claim
that could co-exist with federal copyright law:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a
cost; (ii) the information is time-sensitive; (iii) a
defendant’s use of the information constitutes free
riding on the plaintiff’s efforts; (iv) the defendant is
in direct competition with a product or service
offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other
parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or
others would so reduce the incentive to produce the
product or service that its existence or quality would
be substantially threatened.198
The Second Circuit vacated the injunction against Motorola,
finding that the NBA had failed to establish sufficient competitive
injury to its primary business of producing live basketball games
and licensing game broadcasts.199 With respect to potential
competition with the NBA’s own plans for real time distribution of
game information, the court said the defendant was not free riding

193

Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc. (NBA), 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 844.
195
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp.
1071, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom, NBA, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). The
defendants also made the game information available on an AOL online site, and the
district court included that site within its permanent injunction, resulting in one of the
first, if temporary, victories against misappropriation on the internet.
196
NBA, 105 F.3d at 853.
197
See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
198
Id. at 845.
199
See id. at 841.
194
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since it expended its own resources to collect the information that
it distributed.200
Judge Cote in Barclays held that the equity firms had satisfied
all the necessary NBA elements for a valid misappropriation
claim.201 Fly did not contest that the plaintiffs incurred substantial
expense in generating their equity recommendations and that the
information was time-sensitive.202 On the issue of free riding,
Judge Cote found that “Fly’s business is its free-riding off the
sustained, costly efforts” of the plaintiffs to generate research
highly valued by investors, rejecting Fly’s arguments that its own
aggregation efforts mitigated the appropriation and that since the
information had been obtained from third-party sources, it was
“free for the taking.”203 The direct competition requirement was
more controversial. Fly argued that it was in the news business
and did not provide brokerage services, which was the plaintiffs’
primary business.204 The court took a broad view of the direct
competition requirement.
While it may be true that Fly is a news aggregator
and is in direct competition with other financial
news aggregators, both large and small, each of
these news aggregators is in direct competition with
the Firms when they report the Firms’
Recommendations in a timely and systematic
manner such that the Firms are deprived of the
opportunity to communicate them first-hand to their
clients.205
Based on the testimony of the plaintiffs’ own research
executives, Judge Cote also found that the plaintiffs had
established that the conduct by Fly and similar aggregators
substantially threatened the continued viability of the plaintiffs’
research operations.206 Fly was enjoined from disseminating the
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See id. at 854.
See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 335–43.
See id. at 335.
Id. at 336–37.
See id. at 339–40.
Id. at 340.
See id. at 350, 341.
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plaintiffs’ equity recommendations until two hours after their
release, or in the case of recommendations released after the close
of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, until half an hour
after the re-opening of trading.207
Fly appealed the decision on misappropriation to the Second
Circuit, which had already stayed the injunction.208 After a close
parsing of its earlier opinion in NBA, the Second Circuit held that
the five-element test relied on by Judge Cote was dicta: “[T]he
Court in NBA was opining about the hypothetical set of
circumstances—not present in that case—that might give rise to [a
non-preempted INS-like ‘hot news’] claim.”209 Distinguishing
INS, Judge Sack for the majority held that Barclays’
misappropriation claim failed because Fly was not free riding as
understood in INS.210 “In pressing a ‘hot news’ claim against Fly,
the Firms seek only to protect their Recommendations, something
they create using their expertise and experience rather than acquire
through efforts akin to reporting.”211 The case turned on a
distinction between making and reporting the news. “The Firms
are making the news; Fly, despite the Firm’s understandable desire
to protect their business model, is breaking it.”212 The point was
reiterated at the conclusion of the court’s opinion: “We conclude
that in this case, a Firm’s ability to make news—by issuing a
Recommendation that is likely to affect the market price of a
security—does not give rise to a right for it to control who breaks
that news and how.”213
Barclays and its distinction between making and breaking the
news leaves open the door to claims of misappropriation on the
207

See id. at 347.
See Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 2011).
209
Id. at 899 n.32.
210
See id. at 902.
211
Id. at 903 (emphasis omitted). Also, unlike INS, Fly did not divert a significant
portion of the plaintiffs’ profits to itself. See id. at 904–05.
212
Id. at 902.
213
Id. at 907. Judge Raggi, concurring, disputed the majority’s position that the fiveelement test in NBA was dicta, but concluded that the misappropriation claim against Fly
failed that standard too because the parties were not in “direct competition.” See id. at
911–15 (Raggi, J., concurring). The “created” facts held by the majority to be beyond the
reach of the misappropriation tort are of course precisely the kind of facts targeted by
efforts to expand the scope of copyright protection. See supra Part II.
208
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Internet between rivals more clearly in the business of reporting
the news. The Second Circuit acknowledged as much in an effort
to underscore the limits of its holding.
If a Firm were to collect and disseminate to some
portion of the public facts about securities
recommendations in the brokerage industry
(including, perhaps, such facts it generated itself—
its own Recommendations), and were Fly to copy
the facts contained in the Firm’s hypothetical
service, it might be liable to the Firm on a ‘hotnews’ misappropriation theory.214
The scope of permissible misappropriation claims expanded
further when the majority responded to the concern expressed in
Judge Raggi’s concurrence that the decision “foreclose[d] the
possibility of a ‘hot news’ claim by a party who disseminates news
it happens to create.”215 Declining to endorse even that limitation,
the majority said, “[t]hat issue is simply not before us. We
therefore do not address it, let alone suggest or imply that such a
claim would necessarily be foreclosed.”216
Given the facts of INS, it is not surprising that subsequent
plaintiffs have had success protecting their news from
appropriation by “old” media rivals.217 Now the push is to extend
that success into digital media. Although plaintiffs have yet to
achieve a major precedent establishing the misappropriation tort on

214
Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 905–06. The court had made an analogous concession in
NBA, opining that if some future defendant collected facts from an NBA pager and
transmitted them to its own product, the NBA might well have a claim for
misappropriation. NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 854 (2d Cir. 1997).
215
Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 913 (Raggi, J., concurring).
216
Id. at 906 n.40.
217
See, e.g., McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 239 P.2d 32, 33–34 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952);
Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Pub. Co., 25 A.D.2d 158, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966);
Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 192 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa. 1963);
Gilmore v. Sammons, 269. S.W. 861, 862–63 (Tex. App. 1925). But see Gannett
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Rock Valley Cmty. Press, Inc., 1994 WL 606171, at *5
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that plaintiff’s news stories were not “hot news”); Scranton
Times, LP v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269, 1275 (M.D. Pa. 2009)
(holding that plaintiff failed to show threat to incentive).
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the Internet, they have become adept at avoiding dismissals and
extracting settlements.218
Ninety years after securing relief against INS, AP filed suit
against All Headline News, which was rewriting AP news content
taken from the Internet and distributing it to its own paying web
clients.219 AP’s complaint alleged copyright and trademark
infringement along with other claims—including common law
misappropriation.220 AHN moved to dismiss all but the copyright
claim.221 After holding that New York law governed AP’s
misappropriation claim, Judge Castel denied the motion to dismiss,
finding that AP’s complaint set out the five elements required
under NBA for a valid misappropriation claim.222 The case was
later settled.223 According to a joint press release on the
settlement, AP apparently insisted on the following admission:
“Defendants further acknowledge the tort of ‘hot news
misappropriation’ has been upheld by other courts and was ruled
applicable in this case by U.S. District Court Judge P. Kevin
Castel.”224 All Headline News was cited by the Second Circuit in
Barclays as an example of facts that might support a valid
misappropriation claim.225
Agence France-Presse’s lawsuit against Google for copying its
headlines and leads,226 which was settled when Google agreed to a

218

See, e.g., infra notes 219–32 and accompanying text.
Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
2009)
220
Id. at 457
221
Id.
222
Id. at 460–61.
223
Amanda Ernst, AP Settles “Hot News” Lawsuit With AHN Media,
MEDIABISTRO.COM (July 13, 2009, 3:50 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlny/
ap-settles-hot-news-lawsuit-with-ahn-media_b12121.
224
Id. AP had previously settled another lawsuit alleging copyright infringement and
“hot news” misappropriation against an internet distributor of AP news in Associated
Press v. Moreover Techs, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8699 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 2007). AP Settles
Lawsuit Against Moreover and VeriSign, WEBWIRE.COM (Aug. 18, 2008),
http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=72638.
225
Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 897 (2d Cir. 2011).
226
Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Copyright Infringement,
Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 17, 2005).
See supra text accompanying notes 51–74.
219
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license, also included a claim for “hot news” misappropriation.227
More recently, Dow Jones extracted a settlement from a defendant
who distributed “hot news” from Dow Jones Newswire as part of
its live market coverage.228 A more troubling settlement resulted
from one of the first claims of misappropriation on the Internet. In
1997, the Washington Post and other media companies sued Total
News for operating a website that provided framed links to the
plaintiffs’ news content.229 The plaintiffs’ copyright infringement
claim was problematic.230 According to an attorney for the
plaintiffs, “[t]he Total News plaintiffs, however, did not rely
solely, or even principally, on a copyright infringement theory.
Instead, they led their complaint with a misappropriation cause of
action (among other common law claims).”231 The settlement
precluded the defendant from providing access to the plaintiffs’
content through framed links and purported to grant a revocable
license for other links labeled only with the Internet address of the
linked content.232
Several other cases have refused to dismiss claims directed at
the misappropriation of online content. A federal district court in
New York denied a motion to dismiss a misappropriation count
directed against a defendant who redistributed the plaintiff’s online
financial content in breach of a licensing agreement.233 The court
held that the plaintiff had pled the required NBA elements.234 Two
federal courts in California also relied on the Second Circuit’s
analysis in NBA to deny motions to dismiss misappropriation
claims. In one of the cases, a plaintiff’s attempt to use the cause of
227

First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 84–93.
See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Dow Jones & Co. v. Briefing.com, Inc.,
No. 10 Civ. 03321 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 1679693; Jonathan Stempel,
Dow Jones, Briefing.com Settle “HotNews” Lawsuit, REUTERS.COM (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE6AF37G20101116.
229
Complaint, Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 01190 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Feb. 20, 1997), 1997 WL 33633041.
230
See supra note 49.
231
See Keller, supra note 49, at 422.
232
Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 3, Washington Post Co. v.
Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 01190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 20, 1997), available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/claw/WPvTNsettl.htm.
233
BanxCorp. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
234
Id. at 612–13.
228
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action to prevent the use of its celebrity photos by an Internet
blogger survived a motion to dismiss when the court found that the
misappropriation tort had been adopted in California and the
plaintiff’s complaint satisfied NBA.235 In the other, the court found
that a complaint alleging that a competitor had misappropriated
concert information from the plaintiff’s website met the pleading
requirements of NBA.236 Similar claims continue to appear.237
B. “Hot News” on the Internet
A recent series of student-authored Notes and Comments
enthusiastically supports the recognition of a common law right
against misappropriation of online content as a way to save the
newspaper industry.238 Even the staff of the Federal Trade
Commission has wondered whether a cause of action for
misappropriation might solve the challenges of modern

235

X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 2000 WL 34016436, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
237
See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings Inc., No. 12
Civ. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 467643.
238
See Dennis S. Park, Note, The Associated Press v. All Headline News: How Hot
News Misappropriation Will Shape the Unsettled Customary Practices of Online
Journalism, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 369, 393 (2010); Elaine Stoll, Comment, Hot News
Misappropriation: More Than Nine Decades After INS v. Associated Press, Still an
Important Remedy for News Piracy, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1239, 1280–81 (2011); Brian
Westley, Comment, How a Narrow Application of “Hot News” Misappropriation Can
Help Save Journalism, 60 AM. U .L. REV. 691, 715 (2011); see also Heather Richtarcsik,
Note, Misappropriation in Massachusetts and Around the Country: How Technology Will
Utilize This Tort, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 717, 723 (2001). Several other student authors
advocate a codification of the misappropriation tort. See, e.g., Lauren M. Gregory, Note,
Hot Off the Presses: How Traditional Newspaper Journalism Can Help Reinvent the
“Hot News” Misappropriation Tort in the Internet Age, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 577,
611 (2011); Amy E. Jensen, Comment, When News Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Rethinking
“Hot News” to Help Counter Free Riding on Newspaper Content Online, 60 EMORY L.J.
537, 569 (2010); Jenna Moon, Note, The “Hot News” Misappropriation Doctrine, the
Crumbling Newspaper Industry, and Fair Use as Friend and Foe: What is Necessary to
Preserve “Hot News,” 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 631, 660 (2011). But see Heather
Sherrod, Comment, The “Hot News” Doctrine: It’s Not 1918 Anymore—Why the “Hot
News” Doctrine Shouldn’t Be Used to Save the Newspapers, 48 HOUS. L.REV. 1205,
1239–40 (2012) (concluding that the misappropriation doctrine as applied to news is
inconsistent with the objectives of copyright law).
236
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journalism.239 Yet the common law tort of misappropriation seems
a particularly unsuitable tool to regulate the distribution of news on
the Internet. As an initial matter, leaving national Internet and
media policy to be determined by common law rules adopted in a
handful of states is not a recipe for certainty or stability.240 A
generous count still lists less than a third of the states as
recognizing the misappropriation tort.241 Another count lists only
five “hot news” states.242 But even that small number overstates
the relevant consensus, since as a practical matter the concentration
of the media and financial industries in New York leaves that
single jurisdiction in a position to shape the contours of
information protection on the Internet. In Associated Press v. All
Headline News Corp.,243 for example, the defendant argued that
Florida law, which may not recognize the misappropriation tort,
should govern the “hot news” claim since its editors and web
servers were located there.244 Applying New York’s choice-of-law
rules as the forum state, the court said that New York law
governed since AP is headquartered in New York and hence
suffered its alleged injury there.245 New York media and financial
plaintiffs will usually have little difficulty in making New York the
forum state in light of interpretations of the state’s long-arm

239

See FTC STAFF, DISCUSSION DRAFT: POTENTIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO
SUPPORT THE REINVENTION OF JOURNALISM 1, 5–8 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/docs/new-staff-discussion.pdf.
240
The Second Circuit in Barclays noted this problem. “To the extent that ‘hot news’
misappropriation causes of action are not preempted, the aggregators’ actions may have
different legal significance from state to state—permitted, at least to some extent, in
some; prohibited, at least to some extent, in others.” Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 897–98
(2d Cir. 2011).
241
See Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury
It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 801–02 (1994) (listing fourteen states as having
adopted the misappropriation tort and noting, “[u]nquestionably, New York is the state
that has most heartily embraced the doctrine.”).
242
See Bruce W. Sanford, Bruce D. Brown & Laurie A. Babinski, Saving Journalism
with Copyright Reform and the Doctrine of Hot News, 26 COMM. LAW. 1, 9 (2009)
(listing California, Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania as states explicitly
recognizing hot news misappropriation).
243
608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). See supra text accompanying notes 219–225.
244
Id. at 460.
245
Id. at 460–61.
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jurisdiction statute.246 The New York Court of Appeals, for
example, responding to a certified question from the Second
Circuit on the application of the state’s long-arm statute to a
copyright infringement claim involving the uploading of a New
York plaintiff’s works on the Internet by an out-of-state defendant,
held that the situs of the injury for purposes of personal jurisdiction
was the location of the copyright owner.247 The analysis seems
equally applicable to misappropriation claims.
The misappropriation rationale has been controversial since its
inception. Justice Holmes, dissenting at its creation, flatly rejected
the notion that property arises from value, “even if it took labor
and genius to make it.”248 Justice Brandeis agreed,249 and in his
own oft-quoted dissent, he detailed the comparative advantages of
legislation over the common law if property rights in news are
indeed appropriate.250 Learned Hand, in a series of opinions for
the Second Circuit, concluded that INS undermined the balance
struck by federal copyright and patent law and effectively limited
the case to its facts, since “[t]he difficulties of understanding it
otherwise are insuperable.”251 Three-quarters of a century later,

246
See, e.g., Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 162–65 (N.Y.
2011).
247
See Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d. 30 (2d Cir. 2010)
certifying question to Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 165
(N.Y. 2011). The lower court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was vacated.
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 640 F.3d 497, 501 (2d Cir. 2011).
248
INS, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Property, a creation of law,
does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter of fact.”).
249
But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money
and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not
sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property. The general
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use.
Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
250
“Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a
determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in news or
of the circumstances under which news gathered by a private party should be deemed
affected with a public interest.” Id. at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
251
See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930); see also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir.
1952); Nat’l Comics Pub., Inc. v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951);
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Judge Posner was “hard pressed to find a case in which a claim of
misappropriation should have succeeded.”252
Declaring the
doctrine “alarmingly fuzzy once the extreme position of creating a
legal right against all free riding is rejected,” he concluded,
“[c]larity of analysis would be enhanced if the doctrine and the
very word were banished from discussions of intellectual property
law.”253 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition similarly
advocates an end to the doctrine, concluding that the cases “have
not articulated coherent principles for its application.”254 The
conflicting case law attests to the doctrine’s incoherence.255
There is of course no general principle of law that prohibits a
person or business from benefiting from the efforts of another,
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940).
252
Posner, supra note 12, at 633.
253
Id. at 638, 641.
254
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. b (1995) (“The better
approach, and the one most likely to achieve an appropriate balance between the
competitive interests, does not recognize a residual common law tort of
misappropriation.”). Although I drafted this comment as a co-reporter for the
Restatement, the text was approved by the Advisors Committee, the Members
Consultative Group, and both the Council and membership of the American Law
Institute.
255
Compare, e.g., New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Nat’l Merch. Corp., 141 N.E.2d 702
(Mass. 1957), with Nat’l Tel. Directory Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 263 S.W. 483 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1924) (conflicting results when defendants sold covers with advertising for
plaintiffs’ telephone directories); Nat’l Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup.
Ct. 1955), and Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Serv., Inc., 300
N.Y.S. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937) (enjoining the appropriation of information from
broadcasts of sporting events to broadcast recreations of the events), with Loeb v. Turner,
257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (permitting recreated broadcasts); Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938), with WCVB-TV v.
Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991) (divergent results on unlicensed live
broadcasts of sporting events); Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa.
1937), with RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 712 (1940) (conflicting results on unauthorized radio broadcasts of musical
recordings); Mut. Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1941), with Intermountain Broad. & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F.
Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961) (divergent results on retransmission of broadcast signals);
Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925), app. dismissed, 10 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir.
1926) (enjoining defendant’s use of plaintiff’s retail dispenser system for postcards), with
Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, 27 N.E.2d 212 (N.Y. 1940) (no
relief against defendant’s use of plaintiff’s cabinet system for replacement watch
crystals).
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even when that other is a direct competitor.256 Past attempts to
constrain the scope of the misappropriation doctrine through
canonical requirements do not inspire confidence. Consider, for
example, the Second Circuit’s careful articulation in NBA of the
elements of the tort in New York, where the doctrine is most
mature.257 The fifth of its five required elements demands that “the
ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service
that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.”258
This, according to Judge Posner, is the “meat” of the claim.259 But

256

A small shop, for example, may freely benefit from the customers
attracted by a nearby department store, a local manufacturer may
benefit from increased demand attributable to the promotional efforts
of a national manufacturer of similar goods, and a newspaper may
benefit from reporting on the activities of local athletic teams.
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. b (1995). See, e.g., WCVB-TV v.
Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1991) (“But, the man who clears a
swamp, the developer of a neighborhood, the academic scientist, the school teacher, and
millions of others, each day create ‘value’ (over and above what they are paid) that the
law permits others to receive without charge.”); Nat’l Football League v. Governor of
Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977).
It is true that Delaware is thus making profits [from use of the
plaintiff’s football scores in its state lottery] it would not make but for
the existence of the NFL, but I find this difficult to distinguish from
the multitude of charter bus companies who generate profit from
serving those of plaintiffs’ fans who want to go to the stadium or,
indeed, the sidewalk popcorn salesman who services the crowd as it
surges towards the gate.
Id.
257
In our view, the elements central to an INS claim are: (i) the plaintiff
generates or collects information at some cost or expense; (ii) the
value of the information is highly time-sensitive; (iii) the defendant’s
use of the information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff’s costly
efforts to generate or collect it; (iv) the defendant’s use of the
information is in direct competition with a product or service offered
by the plaintiff; (v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the
efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to produce the
product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
threatened.
NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 852 (citations omitted). These “sophisticated observations” were
ultimately characterized as dicta in Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 901.
258
NBA, 105 F.3d at 852.
259
“The meat is in (v), with (i) through (iv) identifying the conditions in which the
criterion stated in (v) is likely to be satisfied.” McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534
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on what basis can a court confidently predict the future business
behavior of the plaintiff? According to the district judge in
Barclays, proof of “actual, quantifiable damage” is unnecessary.260
The court granted the investment companies a permanent
injunction against the copying of their stock recommendations
based on the testimony of their own research executives about
reduced incentives, supported by the “common sense” of the trial
judge, despite the defendant’s argument that any reduction in the
plaintiffs’ equity research would be caused primarily by the global
recession and the rise of discount brokers.261 Another required
element of the tort demands that “the defendant’s use of the
information is in direct competition with a product or service
offered by the plaintiff.”262 The defendant in Barclays argued that
since the plaintiffs were in the brokerage business and it was a
news aggregator, the direct competition requirement was not
met.263
The district court, however, treated the plaintiffs’
production and dissemination of research reports as a primary
business, competing directly with the defendant’s dissemination.264
It is of course true that a company can be a direct competitor with
respect to one but not another of a plaintiff’s products. Ford
competes directly with Honda in the car market even though,
unlike Honda, it doesn’t also sell lawn mowers. But the
production of equity research is not one of the plaintiffs’ product
markets. The reports are merely one step in their effort to induce
clients to engage in market transactions that generate brokerage

(7th Cir. 2003) (noting that use at trial would not cause reporter to abandon biography of
witness).
260
Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 342–43, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
Conversely, allegations of actual harm are not themselves sufficient to satisfy the
requirement. See Scranton Times, LP v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (allegations that obituaries were copied by a rival newspaper); Fred
Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D.
Mo. 1999) (“For a claim of misappropriation of ‘hot news’ to succeed, defendant’s
actions must make plaintiff virtually cease to participate in the business in question.”).
261
Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 342, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
262
NBA, 105 F.3d at 852.
263
See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 340, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
264
See id. at 340.
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commissions—a market in which the defendant did not
participate.265
The uncertainties exposed by past applications of the “hot
news” tort are magnified when the doctrine is exported into
cyberspace.266 Are bloggers who offer or solicit commentary and
analysis on reposted news stories in direct competition with the
originating source of those stories? Do aggregators that link to the
originating sources even compete at all with the prior publisher?
Do web sites that collect and disseminate information only on
particular topics compete directly with general news sources like
Associated Press or daily newspapers? The answers are not
obvious.267 And how are we to measure the impact of an
265

See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in
News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011). Balganesh offers a novel justification for the
direct competition requirement, and for the misappropriation tort itself, understanding the
doctrine as an attempt to preserve incentives for collaborative news-gathering efforts by
barring free riders. The direct competition requirement thus insures that the parties have
sufficiently common interests in the resource that cost-reducing cooperation would be
likely in the absence of misappropriation. “Direct competition should thus be understood
as a measure of parties’ likelihood of cooperating to lower input costs.” Id. at 474.
Specifically rejecting the district court’s analysis in Barclays, the article notes:
The parties’ products are thus hardly identical, and very different
from that seen among newspapers competing in the same market. . . .
[T]he plaintiff firms and the defendant are very unlikely to enter into
a cooperative arrangement to defray the costs of their activities, since
the expenditures derive from very different activities. . . . Had the
court attempted to analyze direct competition through the lens of the
hot news doctrine’s structural purposes and the theory of competitive
enrichment that it is premised on, it would have been forced to
conclude that this core element was completely missing.
Id. at 476; see also Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive
Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991) (rejecting a property or
moral basis for the tort in favor of an explanation based on competitive markets analysis).
266
This is not a novel insight. See, e.g., Gary Myers, The Restatement’s Rejection of the
Misappropriation Tort: A Victory for the Public Domain, 47 S.C.L. REV. 673, 688 (1996)
(“[T]he common-law property notions and broad unfair competition language of
International News Service are ill-suited to addressing the concerns of either information
producers or information users today.”); Dale P. Olson, Common Law Misappropriation
in the Digital Era, 64 MO. L. REV. 837, 908 (1999) (“[A]s a doctrine of uncertain
dimensions and unpredictable application, misappropriation as applied to the digital era
has a high degree of uncertainty associated with its application.”).
267
Balganesh, supra note 163, at 476.
Merely because an individual uses information collected by another,
even if for commercial purposes, hardly renders him a direct
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appropriation on future incentives in a market where consumers
are typically not charged directly for the product and where content
producers face a fundamental transformation of their industry that
is largely unrelated to any alleged misappropriations? Allowing
the “hot news” tort to roam freely across the Internet is a
momentous decision, and one that should be made only after
considering whether the Internet is different in fundamental ways
from the more tranquil analog news world.
The potential scope of the misappropriation tort is dramatically
broader in cyberspace than in an analog world. The Supreme
Court in INS took great care to distinguish the parties’ rights
against each other from their rights against the public.268 As to the
latter, the Court assumed “that neither party has any property
interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after
the moment of its publication.”269 But on the Internet, where every
blogger, analyst, or excited reader can instantly redistribute
information around the globe to the potential detriment of the
originator, the distinction between competitor and public breaks
down. In addition, information subject to a misappropriation claim
must be “hot,” or as stated in the list of required elements in NBA,
“the value of the information [must be] highly time-sensitive.”270
competitor in the collective action sense in which the requirement
emerged. In other words, a blogger is unlikely to be incentivized (by
the misappropriation doctrine) to enter the enterprise of news
collection—the doctrine’s core objective. An action against a
blogger is unlikely to result in the blogger independently collecting
the news, or indeed in joining a cooperative effort for this purpose.
To equate direct competition with the mere use of the same product,
or indeed its effects on a collector’s sales would dilute the
requirement of its core significance.
Id.; see Clay Calvert, Kayla Gutierrez, & Christina Locke, All the News That’s Fit to
Own: Hot News on the Internet and the Commodification of News in Digital Culture, 11
WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 23 (2009) (“Bloggers simply are not news services;
both may supply important information that many people may consider to be news, but
merely trafficking in similar information does not put them in direct competition.”).
268
INS, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
269
Id.
270
NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 852; see, e.g., BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 2d 596, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To satisfy the second element, Plaintiffs must
allege not only that the news was time-sensitive when it was gathered, but that it was
time-sensitive when it was misappropriated.”); cf. Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors
Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (“The
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But this concept too is problematic on the Internet. In one sense,
much of what people do on the Internet involves time-sensitive
information—not just consuming and sharing traditional local,
national, and international news, but also distributing personal “hot
news” through social media networks like Twitter and Facebook.
The natural lead-time advantage that can temper the need for legal
intervention also virtually disappears in an environment of
instantaneous distribution. Yet in another sense, that same
environment effectively insures that no news on the Internet is
truly “hot.” It is impossible for a second user to obtain the kind of
head start (or even simultaneous start) with the originator in
specific markets that INS achieved over AP with respect to
newspapers distributed later in the middle and western United
States. On the Internet, no one can deprive the originator of its
head start with everyone everywhere, since appropriation is only
possible after the originator has had the opportunity to present the
information to its entire intended audience.271 Hot news cools very
quickly in cyberspace.272
The “hot news” tort targets free riding.273 But this animosity
toward copying is arguably inconsistent with a medium of
‘hot’ news doctrine is concerned with the copying and publication of information
gathered by another before he has been able to utilize his competitive edge.”). This
criterion is subject to a range of interpretations. See, e.g., U.S. Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago
Downs Ass’n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding data on past horse races
protectable).
271
Brief for Amici Curiae Google Inc. and Twitter, Inc. in Support of Reversal,
Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 2589770 at *17.
[U]sers of online services such as Twitter, who post facts or
commentary regarding news stories, are relaying information already
in the public domain. This is in stark contrast to INS, where INS was
able to take advantage of AP-originated content because of a threehour time difference. The Internet has no time zones—once a news
article is made publicly available, it is available to all.
Id.
272
Even the injunction granted by the district court in Barclays restrained publication of
equity recommendations issued during the trading day for only two hours. See Barclays I,
700 F. Supp. 2d at 347, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
273
NBA, 105 F.3d at 852 (“[T]he defendant’s use of the information constitutes freeriding on the plaintiff’s costly efforts to generate or collect it.”). The requirement often
demands little more than copying. See, e.g., Scranton Times, LP v. Wilkes-Barre Pub.
Co., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (defendant newspaper that “simply
copied” death notices from rival newspaper satisfied the “free-riding” requirement).
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communication built on links and search engines designed to
facilitate access to any information that has been released on the
Internet. One well known explanation of INS and its progeny sees
the tort as firmly rooted in the customs of traditional newsgathering.274 Customs on the Internet are different, and a doctrine
that fails to take account of that difference cannot hope to achieve
stability.275 It is worth noting that, unlike the AP during World
War I, online news purveyors have technological tools available to
restrict the unauthorized copying of their products.276 Technical
protections, however, impose a cost on owners by limiting access
by users who might otherwise be a source of increased advertising
revenue or other profit for the originator. Having instead made the
choice to participate in the online culture, it may not be
unwarranted to find an implied license for subsequent
distribution.277
The uncertainties surrounding the scope—and indeed the
continuing existence—of the misappropriation tort are especially
troubling when the target of the claim is speech. Judge Posner,
characterizing the tort as “a doctrine of irreducible vagueness,”
274

Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 91 (1992).
275
Cf. Brief for Amici Curiae Google Inc. and Twitter, Inc., supra note 271, at *14 (“In
a world of citizen journalists and commentators, online news organizations, and
broadcasters who compete 24 hours a day, news can no longer be contained for any
meaningful amount of time.”).
276
[N]ewsgatherers can employ mechanisms to limit access to their
content, including technical barriers to prevent broad access to
content they make available online.
For example, websites
commonly use simple programming instructions known as
“robots.txt” files to communicate instructions (such as instructions
not to link to material on the site) to search engines and news
aggregators. Such instructions are simple to implement, widely
adopted, and provide an automated way for a site to prevent search
engines and aggregators from linking to a web page. In addition,
websites can restrict broad access to online content by using
password-protected platforms. To the extent that information is
shielded by sufficient technological measures, online services will
not index content from such sites.
Id. at *25–26 (footnote omitted).
277
See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–16 (D. Nev. 2006) (noting that
the failure to use technological signals that would prevent caching of website was treated
as an implied license to cache).

C02_DENICOLA (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 2:17 PM

NEWS ON THE INTERNET

117

worried that the NBA elements “cannot tell a would-be
‘misappropriator’ whether his conduct is likely to cross the legal
line.”278 The doctrine’s potential to chill speech is an obvious and
fundamental concern.279
The district court in Barclays,
acknowledging the public interest in unrestrained access to
information, relied on an analogy to the balance between incentive
and public access drawn by intellectual property law.280 Unlike the
misappropriation tort, however, the fields of intellectual property
law that regulate speech all have internal limitations that operate to
lessen conflicts with First Amendment interests. Copyright, for
example, protects only an author’s expression and not the
underlying ideas, which remain open to all, and its fair use doctrine
further accommodates free speech interests.281 Trademark law is

278

Posner, supra note 12, at 638.
See Brief for Amici Curiae Citizen Media Law Project, Electronic Frontier Fd., and
Public Citizen, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL
2647631 at *23 (“If mainstream media outlets, bloggers, and other non-traditional
journalists are unsure whether they are violating the law, they may well think twice about
sharing newsworthy information out of ‘timidity and self-censorship.’”) (quoting Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)).
280
Ultimately, the purpose of the INS tort, like the traditionally accepted
goal of intellectual property law more generally, is to provide an
incentive for the production of socially useful information without
either under—or over—protecting the efforts to gather such
information. A balance must be struck between establishing rewards
to stimulate socially useful efforts on the one hand, and permitting
maximum access to the fruits of those efforts to facilitate still further
innovation and progress on the other. What the Supreme Court said
in Harper & Row on the subject of copyright protection is no less
applicable here: “The challenge of copyright is to strike the difficult
balance between the interests of authors . . . in the control and
exploitation of their writings . . . on the one hand, and society’s
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand.”
Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 344, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Harper &
Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)). Judge Cote, however, held
that the defendant had waived any First Amendment defense. Id. at 352–54.
281
The point is emphasized in the very case cited by Judge Cote to support the analogy
to intellectual property:
In view of the First Amendment’s protections embodied in the Act’s
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use, there is no warrant for expanding,
279
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mainly limited to commercial speech, with its reduced level of
constitutional protection.282 Trade secrets law does not extend
protection to information that is publicly available.283 The right of
publicity, which bars unauthorized exploitation of an individual’s
name or likeness for commercial purposes, does not extend to use
in news reporting.284 The misappropriation doctrine incorporates
no analogous internal safeguards; protection for free speech
interests can come only from the external constraint of the First
Amendment.
Remarkably, there has never been a full-blown First
Amendment analysis of the “hot news” tort by a federal appellate
court.285 The majority opinion in INS reveals no concern with free
speech issues, and even the Brandeis dissent contains only a brief
reference, on public policy grounds, to the propriety of enjoining
the publication of news.286 The absence of a substantial First
Amendment analysis in the 1918 INS opinion is not surprising,
coming as it does more than a decade before the Supreme Court
began to develop a robust First Amendment jurisprudence

as respondents contend should be done, the fair use doctrine to what
amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.
Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003), the Court indicated that copyright’s immunity from
First Amendment scrutiny might be limited to cases in which “Congress has not altered
the traditional contours of copyright protection.”
282
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980).
283
See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (limiting a “trade secret”
to information that is not “generally known” or “readily ascertainable by proper means”).
284
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47, cmt. c (1995) (“The use of a
person’s identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing
ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity.”). In
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court held that a
broadcast of the plaintiff’s entire human cannonball act by a local news channel was too
substantial to qualify as permissible news coverage, noting, “[i]t is evident, and there is
no claim here to the contrary, that petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve
to prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about petitioner’s act.” Id. at
574.
285
See Balganesh, supra note 265, at 489 (“[N]o court has examined the extent to
which the action remains compatible with the constitutional guarantees of free speech
under the First Amendment.”).
286
INS, 248 U.S. 215, 266 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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beginning perhaps with Near v. Minnesota287 in 1931. The Second
Circuit in NBA, deciding in the defendant’s favor on the
misappropriation count and vacating the lower court’s injunction,
saw no need to address the First Amendment defense.288 The First
Amendment issue was similarly avoided in Barclays when the
court held that the misappropriation claim was preempted by the
Copyright Act.289
Academic analysis of the First Amendment question has
revealed significant unresolved issues. Examining legislative
proposals that would give newspapers increased control over their
stories and headlines on the Internet, Professor Yen concludes that
potential overbreadth in the scope of the regulated speech makes it
likely that such protection would run afoul of the First
Amendment.290 Professor Balganesh notes the applicability of the
rule against prior restraints to injunctions against the
misappropriation of “hot news.”291 Perhaps as argued in an amicus
brief in the Barclays case (and by the district court in NBA), the
misappropriation doctrine survives First Amendment scrutiny as a
content-neutral regulation supported by a substantial governmental
interest and narrowly tailored by the required elements of the
tort.292 However, the constitutional issues remain contentious and
unresolved,293 only adding to the general uncertainty surrounding
the misappropriation tort.
287

283 U.S. 697 (1931).
NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 854 n.10 (2d Cir. 1997).
289
See Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d. Cir. 2011).
290
See Yen, supra note 68, at 970.
291
See Balganesh, supra note 265, at 491–92; see also Sherrod, supra note 238, at
1227.
292
Brief for Amicus Curiae Reed Elsevier Inc. in Support of Affirmance, Barclays II,
650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 3032825 at *1920. The lower
court in NBA defended the constitutionality of an injunction by arguing that it was
content neutral and barred only a particular means of reporting on the games. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1086–87, rev’d, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Corrected Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 2935558 at
*50–51 (arguing that “[b]ecause the ‘hot news’ doctrine inherently accommodates First
Amendment interests, there is no need for the separate First Amendment scrutiny Fly and
its amici contend is mandated”).
293
Attacks on the constitutionality of the “hot news” tort typically raise two issues.
One attack questions whether liability can be imposed, consistent with the First
288
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C. Preemption
Debating the contours and ultimate wisdom of the “hot news”
tort should be a purely academic exercise; any actual use of the
state tort to protect news on the Internet—or anywhere else—
seems clearly preempted by the federal Copyright Act. According
to section 301 of the Copyright Act, neither the common law nor
statutes of any state can grant
[l]egal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by Section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by Sections 102 and 103.294
Analysis under section 301 proceeds by asking whether the
object of the state protection falls within the subject matter of the
copyright statute, and whether the nature of the state protection is
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights enjoyed by a copyright
owner, most notably, the right to prevent unauthorized
reproduction.295 If a state statute or common law doctrine is
invoked to protect a computer program, a literary manuscript, or a
character, the “subject matter” element of section 301 is met, and if
the nature of the state protection is equivalent to a right against
unauthorized reproduction, the second element too is satisfied and
application of the state law is preempted.296 On the other hand, if

Amendment, for distributing newsworthy information that has been lawfully obtained.
See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No.
10-1372), 2010 WL 2589041 at *3538; Brief for Amici Curiae Citizen Media Law
Project, Elec. Frontier Fd., & Pub. Citizen, Inc., Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 2647631 at *12; Brief for Amicus Curiae Streetaccount LLC in
Support of Defendant-Appellant, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372),
2010 WL 2589769 at *9–13. The other attack questions whether an injunction against
future misappropriations violates the rule against prior restraints. Id. at *13–14; Reply
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372),
2010 WL 3032827 at *1824; Brief for Amici Curiae Google Inc. and Twitter, Inc., supra
note 271, at *19–26.
294
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
295
Id. § 106(1).
296
See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (Virginia
Computer Crimes Act claim); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
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the state law protects a plaintiff not against unauthorized
reproduction but, as with trademark law, against consumer
confusion as to source, or as with trade secret law, against breaches
of confidence, the state protection is not preempted.297 The
legislative history explains equivalency as an inquiry into whether
the state “causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of
personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are
different in kind from copyright infringement.”298 To escape
preemption, however, the extra “elements” must change the nature
and not merely the scope of the state right. Elements like intent or
scienter, although not required for copyright infringement, are not
themselves sufficient to preserve a state cause of action.299
The NBA’s claim that game statistics had been
misappropriated from its broadcasts for use with the defendants’
pager system prompted an influential analysis of the preemption
issue by the Second Circuit.300 Focusing first on the subject matter
requirement for preemption in section 301, the court faced the
question of whether this application of the misappropriation tort
could escape preemption because only uncopyrightable facts had
been taken.301 The “subject matter of copyright” as used in section
301 could be interpreted to include only matter that is protected by
the Copyright Act. That narrow approach was rejected in NBA,
and the court sensibly concluded that the reach of section 301
extended to both the copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements
of a work, thus avoiding the perverse result that states remain free

denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986) (unjust enrichment claim); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (unfair competition claim).
297
Examples on trademark and passing off include, Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Cont’l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1986) and Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); examples of breaches of confidence
include, Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993) and
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
298
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 100, at 132.
299
See, e.g., Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1226 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 819 (1984); Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204–05
(2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
300
See NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 848–55 (2d Cir. 1997).
301
See id. at 848–50.
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to protect material that Congress has specifically left in the public
domain.302
Next for the NBA court came the question of whether the
misappropriation tort offered protection that was “equivalent” to
copyright. The court began its analysis with a conclusion drawn
from an earlier Second Circuit decision: “Courts are generally
agreed that some form of such a [misappropriation] claim survives
preemption.”303 The statement was followed by a quotation from
the legislative history of section 301 on which that earlier case had
relied:
“Misappropriation” is not necessarily synonymous
with copyright infringement, and thus a cause of
action labeled as “misappropriation” is not
preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right
within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 nor on a right equivalent thereto.
For example, state law should have the flexibility to
afford a remedy (under traditional principles of
equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized
appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not
the literary expression) constituting “hot” news,
whether in the traditional mold of International
News Service v. Associated Press, or in the newer
form of data updates from scientific, business, or
financial data bases.304

302
See id. at 849. Other cases employing a similar interpretation of the “subject matter”
requirement in section 301 include Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1114 (2002); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996); and Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). This interpretation is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of copyright preemption as articulated
prior to the enactment of section 301 in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570
(1973), finding that state protection is limited to material left “unattended” by Congress.
303
NBA, 105 F.3d at 850 (citing Financial Information, 808 F.2d at 208).
304
NBA, 105 F.3d at 850 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976)) (citation
omitted). Other cases indicating that this passage from the House Report preserves at
least some applications of state misappropriation law include Agora Financial, LLC v.
Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 496 (D. Md. 2010); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp.
2d 1102, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone,
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That said, the court in NBA moved directly to a consideration
of the “breadth of the ‘hot news’ claim that survives
preemption.”305 After describing the elements of a “hot news”
misappropriation claim, the court looked for “extra elements” that
distinguished the state right from copyright, and found these:
We therefore find the extra elements—those in
addition
to
the
elements
of
copyright
infringement—that allow a “hot-news” claim to
survive preemption are: (i) the time-sensitive value
of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a
defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence
of the product or service provided by the
plaintiff.306
It is a questionable list. The first “extra element” merely
narrows the subject matter of the tort. A state prohibition against
copying material from some small subset of works—stories about
boy wizards or photographs of Madonna—would surely still be
preempted. The second element—free riding—is usually satisfied
in a misappropriation case by proof of copying, which is exactly
equivalent to the primary protection afforded by copyright. The
third element merely links the state right against copying to the
degree of resulting harm. A state statute aimed at keeping record
companies in business by prohibiting the sharing of music files on
the Internet would still be preempted.
When Barclays objected to the appropriation of its stock
recommendations by Fly, the district court, after quoting the same
legislative history, said that the NBA case had “finally resolved”
Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 1999); and Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp.
823, 834 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990).
305
NBA, 105 F.3d at 850.
306
Id. at 853. Not everyone agrees. See Sherrod, supra note 238, at 1224 (“The extra
elements laid out in National Basketball Ass’n do not differ qualitatively from copyright;
they only describe the nature of the copying.”). See also, e.g., Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v.
Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 756 (D. Md. 2003) (“‘Free-riding,’ however, the
only element that constitutes a wrongful act, seems indistinguishable from the right to
reproduce, perform, distribute or display a work.”). The NBA’s misappropriation claim
was ultimately rejected because it failed to establish sufficient competitive impact on its
main businesses of staging and broadcasting basketball games, a necessary component of
a non-preempted claim. See NBA, 105 F.3d at 853–54.
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the question of whether a “hot news” claim survives preemption,307
and applied the elements of a “surviving” misappropriation claim
taken from that case to enjoin the defendant.308
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with NBA’s interpretation
of the subject matter requirement—Barclays could not avoid
preemption by arguing that the copied securities recommendations
were not themselves copyrightable, since the reports from which
they were taken were clearly within the subject matter of the
statute.309 Quoting the identical legislative history, the court also
agreed with NBA that “INS-like state-law torts would survive
preemption.”310 But according to the majority in Barclays, NBA’s
five-part description of the elements of a misappropriation claim
that would survive preemption was dicta.311 As for Barclays’
claim, it was not sufficiently “INS-like” to avoid preemption.312
Fly was not free riding in the INS sense. It had not copied news
gathered by Barclays, but instead was collecting and reporting
news made by Barclays and similar organizations. It was also not
clear, again in contrast to INS, that the defendant had diverted the
plaintiff’s profits—commissions on the securities transactions it
hoped to generate through its recommendations—to itself. In a bit
of its own speculation, the court said that if the plaintiff had
instead collected and disseminated facts about securities
recommendations in the brokerage industry, it might well have a
valid misappropriation claim against a defendant who copied

307

Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 876
(2d Cir. 2011).
308
See id. at 335–43.
309
See Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 902.
310
Id. at 894.
311
[I]n NBA, the Court held that the facts of that case could not support a
non-preempted “hot news” claim. Its language regarding the
elements that might in some later case allow a claim to avoid
preemption, and its discussion of why such an exception to
preemption was narrow, were useful commentaries on the reasoning
and possible implications of the Court’s holding. But the language
itself was not meant to, and did not, bind us, the district court, or any
other court to subsequently consider this subject.
Id. at 899 n.32 (emphasis in original).
312
Id. at 905.
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them,313 specifically referring to AP’s claim against the copying of
its news in the All Headline News case.314
Judge Raggi concurred in an insightful opinion that rejected the
majority’s conclusion that NBA’s five-part description of a nonpreempted misappropriation was dicta.315 But Barclays’ claim
failed the NBA test, she believed, because the defendant’s conduct
was not sufficiently competitive with the plaintiff’s business.316
Like the majority, she cited All Headline News as an example of a
claim that might survive preemption.317 Although Judge Raggi
thought herself bound by NBA, she remained skeptical about
“whether the test adequately identifies tort claims with ‘extra
elements’ qualitatively different from the rights protected by
copyright.”318
Judge Raggi also made an all too rare observation about the
legislative history on which the NBA analysis rests. The passage
on misappropriation quoted from the House Report was
specifically directed at a portion of section 301 in the copyright
revision bill that was deleted prior to enactment.319 At the time
that the House Report quoted in NBA was written, the copyright
revision bill included a provision preserving rights under state law
with respect to:
[A]ctivities violating legal or equitable rights that
are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106, including rights against
misappropriation not equivalent to any such
exclusive rights, breaches of contract, breaches of
trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy,
313

Id. at 905–06.
Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457–58
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); see supra text accompanying notes 219–25.
315
Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 911 (Raggi, J., concurring).
316
Id. at 913 (Raggi, J., concurring).
317
Id. at 914 (Raggi, J., concurring).
318
Id. at 911 (Raggi, J., concurring).
319
Id. at 910 (Raggi, J., concurring). Similar observations were made in Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 n.25 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987) and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp.
640, 659–60 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
314
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defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as
passing off and false representation.320
This attempt to preserve at least some applications of
misappropriation was a complete turnaround from prior versions of
the revision bill, which had included no reference to
misappropriation in the list of preserved state rights.321 Indeed, an
earlier House Report had stated, “where the cause of action
involves the form of unfair competition commonly referred to as
‘misappropriation,’ which is nothing more than copyright
protection under another name, section 301 is intended to have
preemptive effect.”322 Misappropriation (along with trespass and
conversion) first appeared in the section 301 list of unpreempted
rights in the 1975 Senate bill, along with the now-familiar
reference to INS in the accompanying Senate Report.323 The
House Report, written the following year, contained the identical
comment on INS.324 During the final Senate debate before passage
of the revision bill, Senator Hugh Scott expressed regret that time
did not permit consideration of an amendment to delete the
reference to misappropriation from section 301. He included in the
record a letter from the Department of Justice expressing fear that
the recent addition of misappropriation in section 301, which it
labeled “a vague and uncertain” theory, would “defeat the
underlying purpose of the preemption section.”325 When the
House took up the Senate bill, Representative Seiberling offered an
amendment to delete the entire list of examples in section
301(b)(3), citing the Justice Department’s objection to the
inclusion of misappropriation. But Seiberling, prompted by a
320

S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1975), quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 24
(1976).
321
See, e.g., H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1966). See generally Henry D. Fetter,
Copyright Revision and the Preemption of State “Misappropriation” Law: A Study in
Judicial and Congressional Interaction, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 367 (1978) (tracing
the drafting history of the preemption provision).
322
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 129 (1966).
323
S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1975), quoted in Fetter, supra note 321, at 417. The
passage on misappropriation quoted from the House Report by the court in NBA appeared
for the first time in Senate Report 473. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 116 (1975).
324
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132.
325
See 122 Cong. Rec. 3836-37 (1976) (letter to Hon. Hugh Scott from Thomas
Kauper, Asst. Att. General, Antitrust Div. (Feb. 13, 1976).
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query from Representative Railsback, also offered a different—and
inconsistent—explanation, expressing a desire merely to avoid
encouraging states to adopt the doctrine.326 The amendment
deleting the list was adopted and the revision bill was passed.327
The Conference Committee accepted the House amendment
without comment.328
This bit of history is generally known to copyright scholars,
although apparently less so to the courts. Less well known entirely
is the origin of this fleeting appearance of misappropriation in
section 301 and the accompanying legislative history that has
proved so difficult to ignore. My casebook co-author Ralph
Brown traced the entire episode to a 1975 report from American
Bar Association Committee No. 309—Copyright and New
Technology (“ABA Committee Report”), disapproving any
limitation on rights against misappropriation in the copyright
revision bill.329 The ABA Committee Report, prepared for an
ABA meeting in August 1975, included a proposed revision of
section 301 to protect the misappropriation tort and a list of
examples, including INS, where misappropriation protection
should remain available.330 By November, when the Senate Report
on the revision bill was published, the proposed change had been
incorporated into the bill verbatim and the list of examples from

326

See 122 Cong. Rec. 32,015 (1976).
See id.
328
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 78–79 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810, 5819–20.
329
Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright,
24 UCLA L. REV. 1070, 1101 n.161 (1977) (citing A.B.A. Section of Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Law, Committee Reports to be Presented at [Aug. 1975] Meeting, REPORT
OF COMMITTEE NO. 309, COPYRIGHT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 177 (1975) [hereinafter
ABA COMMITTEE REPORT]). We mentioned this small discovery in a footnote in our
casebook on copyright law. See RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT
635 n.f (7th ed. 1998). Unfortunately, a casebook footnote is apparently not the best way
to get the word out.
330
ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 329, at 180–82. Another justification offered
for the proposed amendment to section 301 was to achieve compatibility with a pending
federal codification of the misappropriation doctrine, which was never enacted. Id. at
181.
327
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the ABA Committee Report was inserted in the Senate Report.331
The identical list of examples, including the reference to INS, soon
also appeared in the House Report.332 The ABA Committee
Report establishes beyond doubt that the legislative history relied
on in cases like NBA and Barclays was intended not as
commentary on the general statutory concept of “equivalent”
rights, but was instead an attempt to justify a specific last-minute
amendment to the bill—an amendment that was subsequently
struck from the bill before it was enacted.333
Reliance on this legislative history in cases like NBA and
Barclays seems questionable for another reason. It is probably not
a coincidence that the four examples of misappropriation described
in the ABA Committee Report and subsequently reproduced in the
Senate and House reports all involve the protection of “facts” or
“data.”334 The thrust of the concern seems to be that the copyright
revision bill would preempt state protection for matter that is not
protected by copyright. This is apparent on a close reading of the
reference to the INS case. Both the ABA Committee Report and
matching legislative history carefully limit the target of state
protection to “‘hot’ news”: “For example, state law should have
the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional principles of
equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation
by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the literary expression)
constituting ‘hot’ news .”335 If protection against misappropriation
is indeed not equivalent to copyright, the parenthetical excluding
state protection for literary expression is meaningless. The tort
would be available to protect any subject matter. The exclusion of
state protection for literary expression reveals the ABA
Committee’s real concern: copyright should not preempt state
protection for uncopyrightable subject matter.336 But both NBA
331

S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1975), quoted in S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 20 (1975).
The examples from the ABA Committee Report appear in Senate Report 473. See S. REP.
NO. 94-473, at 116.
332
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132.
333
See ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 329, at 177–82.
334
See id.
335
ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 329, at 180; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132.
336
Some cases have interpreted the legislative history as preserving misappropriation
claims only for uncopyrightable material. See Agora Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp.

C02_DENICOLA (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 2:17 PM

NEWS ON THE INTERNET

129

and Barclays flatly reject that proposition, holding that preemption
can reach even uncopyrightable subject matter in a copyrighted
work.337
What if the reference to misappropriation and INS in the
legislative history is ignored, as it should be?338 The case law
already provides the answer. In misappropriation cases that
involve the “subject matter of copyright” but not “hot news,” i.e.,
where the reference to INS is irrelevant, the courts have been
virtually unanimous in holding that a misappropriation cause of
action is preempted.339
2d 491, 501–02 (D. Md. 2010); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp.
1523, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 101[B][2][b] (“[O]ne
could plausibly maintain that the misappropriation protection preserved by the legislative
history relates to ‘subject matter’ outside of copyright.”).
337
See supra text accompanying notes 302 and 309.
338
This may be easier said than done. District court judges in the Second Circuit are
presumably bound by NBA’s ruling that the legislative history justifies the conclusion that
some applications of the misappropriation tort survive preemption. Panels in subsequent
Second Circuit cases are also apparently bound by that ruling. “[T]his panel is bound by
prior decisions of this court unless and until the precedents established therein are
reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 58 (2d
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2138 (2010). This proposition was cited by the
majority in Barclays. Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 2011). Thus, although the
judges in Barclays more clearly understood the questionable relevance, if not the
provenance of the legislative history, “[t]he NBA panel decided the case before it, and we
think that the law it thus made regarding ‘hot news’ preemption is, as we have tried to
explain, determinative here.” Id. at 899.
339
See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 302 (6th Cir. 2004)
(screenplay); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 879 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
820 (1986) (research notes); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 247
(2d Cir. 1983) (character); Brainard v. Vassar, 561 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932 (M.D. Tenn.
2008) (songs); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 661 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d on
other grounds, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (telephone listings); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704
F. Supp. 823, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990)
(literary work); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535–36
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (snowflake design); Schuchart & Assocs., Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540
F. Supp. 928, 944–45 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (architectural drawings); Fairway Contractors,
Inc. v. Ahern, 970 P.2d 954, 957 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (home design); see also 1
NIMMER, supra note 58, § 1.01[B][1][f][iii] at 1-48 (“[L]egions of cases have held preempted claims for misappropriation.”) (footnotes omitted). Some cases have held that
state protection for works of authorship may also be preempted under the Supremacy
Clause. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988)
(statute enforcing “shrink wrap” restrictions against copying software). State protection
of facts in a copyrighted work through the misappropriation doctrine may conflict with
the federal prohibition of copyright protection for facts, and hence may “[stand] as an
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CONCLUSION
Newspapers, investment firms, and other content providers
seek to control the distribution of their work on the Internet.
Copyright law already protects the text of their news, at least
against most commercial copiers, although their headlines may be
too small and too useful as titles to merit separate protection as
works of authorship. News providers want more. They are
pressing to expand copyright into the previously forbidden realm
of facts by arguing that creativity in the “creation” of “soft” facts is
sufficient for protection. But copyright law demands creativity in
the manner of expression, which statements of isolated facts
generally lack. Facts, whether “soft” and “created” or “hard” and
“discovered,” belong in the public domain where the Copyright
Act clearly puts them. Extending protection to facts also
fundamentally alters the contours of copyright in a way that
undermines its traditional insulation from scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
Content providers are also seeking to resurrect the century-old
tort of misappropriation, a contentious and formless doctrine with a
notably checkered history.
It is especially dangerous in
cyberspace, where it conflicts with the structure and culture of the
Internet and where a central premise of the doctrine—the
distinction between a competitor and the public—quickly breaks
down. Unlike traditional intellectual property doctrine, the
misappropriation tort lacks internal limitations that temper
conflicts with the First Amendment, and its inherent uncertainty,
magnified on the Internet, chills protected speech. Application of
the tort to protect “hot news” is plainly preempted by federal
copyright law. The misappropriation doctrine prohibits copying—
a right precisely equivalent to copyright’s ban on unauthorized
reproduction. A passage in the legislative history indisputably

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note
58, § 17.3.3, at 17:41 (“Although the Copyright Act withholds federal protection from
ideas and facts, and does not forbid their protection under state law, cases may arise in
which state protection of ideas or facts will so offend the federal balance that it will be
invalidated under the supremacy clause.”).
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directed at a provision that was intentionally removed from the
copyright revision bill should not alter that obvious conclusion.

